This case has been cited 5 times or more.
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2009-09-25 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| As a rule, a change of theory cannot be allowed.[13] However, when the factual bases thereof would not require presentation of any further evidence by the adverse party in order to enable it to properly meet the issue raised in the new theory,[14] as in this case, the Court may give due course to the petition and resolve the principal issues raised therein. | |||||
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2009-04-07 |
TINGA, J. |
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| The standard test in determining whether a person is negligent in doing an act whereby injury or damage results to the person or property of another is this: could a prudent man, in the position of the person to whom negligence is attributed, foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable consequence of the course actually pursued? If so, the law imposes a duty on the actor to refrain from that course or to take precautions to guard against its mischievous results, and the failure to do so constitutes negligence. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring of the admonition born of this provision, is always necessary before negligence can be held to exist.[36] | |||||
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2008-11-20 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| We had also observed that PAL is also guilty of raising prohibited new matters[23] and in changing its theory of defense[24] since it is only in the present petition that it alleged the contributory negligence of Lopez. | |||||
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2008-02-04 |
REYES, R.T., J. |
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| Even granting that the passenger bus was at fault, it's fault will not necessarily absolve private respondents from liability. If at fault, the passenger bus will be a joint tortfeasor along with private respondents. The liability of joint tortfeasors is joint and solidary. This means that petitioner may hold either of them liable for damages from the collision. In Philippine National Construction Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[31] this Court held: According to the great weight of authority, where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or omission of two or more persons, although acting independently of each other, are, in combination, the direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a third person and it is impossible to determine in what proportion each contributed to the injury, either is responsible for the whole injury, even though his act alone might not have caused the entire injury, or the same damage might have resulted from the acts of the other tort-feasor x x x. In Far Eastern Shipping Company v. Court of Appeals, the Court declared that the liability of joint tortfeasors is joint and solidary, to wit: It may be said, as a general rule, that negligence in order to render a person liable need not be the sole cause of an injury. It is sufficient that his negligence, concurring with one or more efficient causes other than plaintiff's, is the proximate cause of the injury. Accordingly, where several causes combine to produce injuries, a person is not relieved from liability because he is responsible for only one of them, it being sufficient that the negligence of the person charged with injury is an efficient cause without which the injury would not have resulted to as great an extent, and that such cause is not attributable to the person injured. It is no defense to one of the concurrent tortfeasors that the injury would not have resulted from his negligence alone, without the negligence or wrongful acts of the other concurrent tortfeasors. Where several causes producing an injury are concurrent and each is an efficient cause without which the injury would not have happened, the injury may be attributed to all or any of the causes and recovery may be had against any or all of the responsible persons although under the circumstances of the case, it may appear that one of them was more culpable, and that the duty owed by them to the injured person was not the same. No actor's negligence ceases to be a proximate cause merely because it does not exceed the negligence of other actors. Each wrongdoer is responsible for the entire result and is liable as though his acts were the sole cause of the injury. | |||||