This case has been cited 7 times or more.
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2015-09-02 |
BRION, J. |
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| In People v. Torres,[51] the accused assailed the validity of the search conducted pursuant to a search warrant as it was supposedly made without the presence of at least two witnesses, but the Court found otherwise, citing the testimonies taken during the trial contradicting this claim. A similar objection was made by the accused in People v. Nuñez[52], but the Court noted the testimony of the officer conducting the search who stated that it was made in the presence of the accused himself and two barangay officials. | |||||
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2009-06-30 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| To be liable for the crime, the following elements must concur: (a) the accused is found in possession of a regulated drug; (b) the person is not authorized by law or by duly constituted authorities; and (c) the accused has knowledge that the said drug is a regulated drug.[12] All these were found present in the instant case. | |||||
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2009-03-13 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| Appellant's defense of denial is unavailing. There was no evidence that PO2 Brubio was motivated by reasons other than his duty to enforce the law. In fact, appellant was caught in flagrante delicto in a legitimate entrapment operation and was positively identified by the police officers who conducted the operation. As between the categorical testimony that rings of truth on one hand, and a bare denial on the other, the former is generally held to prevail.[11] | |||||
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2008-12-08 |
CARPIO MORALES, J. |
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| The finding of illicit drugs and paraphernalia in a house or building owned or occupied by a particular person raises the presumption of knowledge and possession thereof which, standing alone, is sufficient to convict.[10] | |||||
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2008-11-20 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| In People v. Torres,[10] we held there was constructive possession of prohibited drugs even when the accused was not home when the prohibited drugs were found in the master's bedroom of his house. | |||||
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2008-08-20 |
YNARES-SATIAGO, J. |
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| Appellant's defense of denial is unavailing. He was caught in flagrante delicto in a legitimate entrapment operation and was positively identified by the police officers who conducted the operation. Mere denial cannot prevail over the positive testimony of a witness; it is a self-serving negative evidence which cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the declaration of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. As between the categorical testimony that rings of truth on one hand, and a bare denial on the other, the former is generally held to prevail.[11] | |||||
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2007-04-27 |
TINGA, J. |
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| These positive declarations bolster the inevitable conclusion that appellant had indeed raped AAA. The trial court correctly lent credence to the straightforward version of the victim as against the bare denial by appellant. It has been an oft-repeated rule that mere denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, has no weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary value than the positive testimony of a rape victim.[24] As between a categorical testimony that rings of truth on one hand, and a bare denial on the other, the former is generally held to prevail. [25] | |||||