This case has been cited 2 times or more.
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2014-10-22 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
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| The petitioner claims the reclassification on the basis of Municipal Resolution No. 16-98. Given the foregoing clarifications, however, the resolution was ineffectual for that purpose. A resolution was a mere declaration of the sentiment or opinion of the lawmaking body on a specific matter that was temporary in nature, and differed from an ordinance in that the latter was a law by itself and possessed a general and permanent character.[49] We also note that the petitioner did not show if the requisite public hearings were conducted at all. In the absence of any valid and complete reclassification, therefore, the Dakila property remained under the category of an agricultural land. | |||||
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2007-01-26 |
VELASCO, JR., J. |
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| Sec. 19. Immediate execution of judgment; how to stay same. If judgment is rendered against the defendant, execution shall issue immediately upon motion, unless appeal has been perfected and the defendant to stay execution files a sufficient supersedeas bond, approved by the Municipal Trial Court and executed in favor of the plaintiff to pay the rents, damages, and costs accruing down to the time of the judgment appealed from, and unless during the pendency of the appeal, he deposits with the appellate court the amount of rent due from time to time under the contract, if any, as determined by the judgment of the Municipal Trial Court. x x x The foregoing rule provides that a judgment in favor of the plaintiffs shall be immediately executory. It can be stayed by the defendant only by perfecting an appeal, filing a supersedeas bond, and making a periodic deposit of the rental or the reasonable compensation for the use and occupancy of the property during the pendency of the appeal. These requisites are mandatory and concurrent.[19] Thus, if not complied with, execution will issue as a matter of right. | |||||