This case has been cited 9 times or more.
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2010-08-03 |
VILLARAMA, JR., J. |
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| Under this provision, it is the plaintiff who has to prove by a preponderance of evidence: (1) the damages suffered by the plaintiff; (2) the fault or negligence of the defendant or some other person for whose act he must respond; and (3) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence and the damages incurred.[19] This the petitioners failed to do. The President of Vergon signed the building permit as a precondition for its approval by the local government, but it did not guarantee that petitioners were constructing the structure within the metes and bounds of petitioners' lot. The signature of the President of Vergon on the building permit merely proved that petitioners were authorized to make constructions within the subdivision project of Vergon. And while petitioners acted in good faith in building their house on Lot No. 2-R, petitioners did not show by what authority the agents or employees of Vergon were acting when they pointed to the lot where the construction was made nor was petitioners' claim on this matter corroborated by sufficient evidence. | |||||
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2010-07-26 |
MENDOZA, J. |
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| The antecedents mentioned earlier in this disposition readily show the congruence in the factual findings of the trial court and the appellate court. Thus, and in the absence of any exceptional circumstances[21] to warrant the contrary, this Court must abide by the prevailing rule that findings of fact of the trial court, more so when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding and conclusive upon It.[22] Accordingly, the trial court and the appellate court's findings that the subject "oven, proofing cabinet and lateral proofer were badly dented and deformed and that their glass parts were broken to pieces," and that the oven was also rendered inoperable, stand. The findings of the two courts below, with regard to the fault of Bormaheco's forklift operator, also hold. | |||||
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2008-06-27 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. In every tort case filed under this provision, plaintiff has to prove by a preponderance of evidence: (1) the damages suffered by the plaintiff; (2) the fault or negligence of the defendant or some other person for whose act he must respond; and (3) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence and the damages incurred.[35] | |||||
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2008-01-28 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| Although both the RTC and the CA failed to categorically state that respondents did not harvest or appropriate for themselves the stocked prawns, the RTC and CA nevertheless found that petitioner's claim of being forcibly dispossessed of the leased premises cannot be given credence. Well-settled is the rule that factual findings of the trial court, affirmed by the CA, are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal.[12] Although such general rule admits of exceptions,[13] this case does not fall under any of them. | |||||
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2007-07-12 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| At this juncture, it would be fitting to mention that under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be raised for the simple reason that the Court is not a trier of facts.[21] It is not duty-bound to analyze and weigh again the evidence considered in the proceedings below.[22] This is especially true where the trial court's factual findings are adopted and affirmed by the CA as in the present case. Factual findings of the trial court, affirmed by the CA, are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal.[23] Here, both the RTC and the CA gave more credence to the respondents' title and found that the petitioners' occupation of the subject property was by the mere tolerance of the respondents. Accordingly, as far as this Court is concerned, these findings are already final. | |||||
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2007-03-20 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| Negligence is the failure to observe for the protection of the interest of another person that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand,[20] whereby such other person suffers injury. For health care providers, the test of the existence of negligence is: did the health care provider either fail to do something which a reasonably prudent health care provider would have done, or that he or she did something that a reasonably prudent health care provider would not have done; and that failure or action caused injury to the patient;[21] if yes, then he is guilty of negligence. | |||||
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2007-02-06 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| In this case, the actual damages cannot be determined. Defendant-appellant Josefa Yu testified on supposed lost profits without clear and appreciable explanation. Despite her submission of the used and unused ticket stubs, there was no evidence on the daily net income, the routes plied by the bus and the average fares for each route. The submitted basis is too speculative and conjectural. No reports regarding the average actual profits and other evidence of profitability necessary to prove the amount of actual damages were presented. Thus, the Court a quo did not err in not awarding damages in favor of defendants-appellants.[64] We usually defer to the expertise of the CA, especially when it concurs with the factual findings of the RTC.[65] Indeed, findings of fact may be passed upon and reviewed by the Supreme Court in the following instances: (1) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3) where there is a grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts; (4) when judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the lower court, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and such findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (6) when the factual findings of the CA are contrary to those of the trial court; (7) when the findings of fact are themselves conflicting; (8) when the findings of fact are conclusions made without a citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; (10) when the findings of fact of the lower court are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record.[66] However, the present case does not fall under any of the exceptions. We are in full accord with the CA that Spouses Yu failed to prove their counterclaim. | |||||
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2006-11-02 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| In every tort case filed under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, plaintiff has to prove by a preponderance of evidence: (1) the damages suffered by the plaintiff; (2) the fault or negligence of the defendant or some other person for whose act he must respond; and (3) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence and the damages incurred.[13] | |||||
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2006-03-31 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| This Court reiterated in Child Learning Center, Inc. v. Tagario,[10] the well-settled rule that:Generally, factual findings of the trial court, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal. The established exceptions are: (1) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (2) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (3) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (4) when the judgment of the Court of Appeals is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (8) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; and (9) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record. (Emphasis supplied) | |||||