This case has been cited 4 times or more.
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2010-10-06 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| The CA has, under the said provision of the Rules of Court, discretion to dismiss or not to dismiss respondent's appeal. Although said discretion must be a sound one, to be exercised in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play, having in mind the circumstances obtaining in each case, the presumption is that it has been so exercised.[32] It is incumbent upon herein petitioners, as actors in the case at bar, to offset this presumption. Yet, the records before the Court do not satisfactorily show that the CA has committed grave abuse of discretion in not dismissing the LBP's appeal. | |||||
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2008-10-17 |
REYES, R.T., J. |
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| In several cases,[48] this Court stressed that the grounds for dismissal of an appeal under Section 1 of Rule 50[49] are discretionary upon the appellate court. The very wording of the rule uses the word "may" instead of "shall." This indicates that it is only directory and not mandatory.[50] Sound discretion must be exercised in consonance with the tenets of justice and fair play, keeping in mind the circumstances obtaining in each case.[51] | |||||
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2008-04-16 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| For a writ of certiorari to issue, the applicant must show that the court or tribunal acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the challenged order. Grave abuse of discretion is defined as such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be grave, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of law.[17] | |||||
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2007-10-17 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| Moreover, it should be remembered that the Rules were promulgated to set guidelines in the orderly administration of justice, not to shackle the hand that dispenses it. Otherwise, the courts would be consigned to being mere slaves to technical rules, deprived of their judicial discretion. Technicalities must take a backseat to substantive rights. After all, it is circumspect leniency in this respect that will give the parties the fullest opportunity to ventilate the merits of their respective causes, rather than have them lose life, liberty, honor or property on sheer technicalities.[61] | |||||