This case has been cited 3 times or more.
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2015-08-18 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
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| x x x uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every person. This commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our Constitution which provides: “The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights.” The Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every person to liberty and due process, ensuring that those detained or arrested can participate in the proceedings before a court, to enable it to decide without delay on the legality of the detention and order their release if justified. In other words, the Philippine authorities are under obligation to make available to every person under detention such remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include the right to be admitted to bail.[38] | |||||
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2007-10-09 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| In Mijares v. Ranada,[15] the Court held thus: [G]enerally accepted principles of international law, by virtue of the incorporation clause of the Constitution, form part of the laws of the land even if they do not derive from treaty obligations. The classical formulation in international law sees those customary rules accepted as binding result from the combination [of] two elements: the established, widespread, and consistent practice on the part of States; and a psychological element known as the opinion juris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity). Implicit in the latter element is a belief that the practice in question is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it.[16] (Emphasis supplied) "Generally accepted principles of international law" refers to norms of general or customary international law which are binding on all states,[17] i.e., renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy, the principle of sovereign immunity,[18] a person's right to life, liberty and due process,[19] and pacta sunt servanda,[20] among others. The concept of "generally accepted principles of law" has also been depicted in this wise: Some legal scholars and judges look upon certain "general principles of law" as a primary source of international law because they have the "character of jus rationale" and are "valid through all kinds of human societies." (Judge Tanaka in his dissenting opinion in the 1966 South West Africa Case, 1966 I.C.J. 296). O'Connell holds that certain priniciples are part of international law because they are "basic to legal systems generally" and hence part of the jus gentium. These principles, he believes, are established by a process of reasoning based on the common identity of all legal systems. If there should be doubt or disagreement, one must look to state practice and determine whether the municipal law principle provides a just and acceptable solution. x x x [21] (Emphasis supplied) Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas defines customary international law as follows: Custom or customary international law means "a general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation [opinio juris]." (Restatement) This statement contains the two basic elements of custom: the material factor, that is, how states behave, and the psychological or subjective factor, that is, why they behave the way they do. | |||||
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2007-08-03 |
TINGA, J. |
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| Respondent may also have been under the impression that the case before him was one for extradition, particularly because Gao Yuan's arrest and detention were pursuant to a request from the PROC to hold and deport her in connection with an embezzlement case in China. If that were so, his acts of ordering Gao Yuan's release upon the filing of a bond would have been sanctioned by this Court's ruling in Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, represented by the Philippine Department of Justice v. Hon. Felixberto T. Olalia and Juan Antonio Muñoz[39] which allows the prospective extraditee to apply for bail, provided that he presents clear and convincing evidence that he is not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition court. However, the petition filed before respondent was one for habeas corpus which raised the simple issue of whether Gao Yuan was held under lawful authority. The Return filed by the Commissioner sufficiently established the basis of Gao Yuan's detention, which were the Charge Sheet and Summary Deportation Order. By the time the petition for habeas corpus was filed, there was already a legal basis to detain Gao Yuan. Her confinement was not illegal. It was thus error for respondent to continue with the proceeding and thereafter order her release upon posting of a cash bond. | |||||