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HEHERSON ALVAREZ SUBSTITUTED BY ELISEA G. GOZUN v. PICOP RESOURCES

This case has been cited 8 times or more.

	GR No. 171101 2011-07-05	HACIENDA LUISITA v. PRESIDENTIAL AGRARIAN REFORM COUNCIL VELASCO JR., J.
The last but the most important requisite that the constitutional issue must be the very lis mota of the case does not likewise obtain. The lis mota aspect is not present, the constitutional issue tendered not being critical to the resolution of the case. The unyielding rule has been to avoid, whenever plausible, an issue assailing the constitutionality of a statute or governmental act. [110] If some other grounds exist by which judgment can be made without touching the constitutionality of a law, such recourse is favored. [111] Garcia v. Executive Secretary explains why: Lis Mota -- the fourth requirement to satisfy before this Court will undertake judicial review -- means that the Court will not pass upon a question of unconstitutionality, although properly presented, if the case can be disposed of on some other ground, such as the application of the statute or the general law. The petitioner must be able to show that the case cannot be legally resolved unless the constitutional question raised is determined. This requirement is based on the rule that every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality; to justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, and not one that is doubtful, speculative, or argumentative. [112] (Italics in the original.)
	GR Nos. 171947-48 2011-02-15	MMDA v. CONCERNED RESIDENTS OF MANILA BAY VELASCO JR., J.
In Noblejas v. Teehankee,[19] it was held that the Court cannot be required to exercise administrative functions such as supervision over executive officials. The issue in that case was whether the Commissioner of Land Registration may only be investigated by the Supreme Court, in view of the conferment upon him by law (Republic Act No. 1151) of the rank and privileges of a Judge of the Court of First Instance. The Court, answering in the negative, stated: To adopt petitioner's theory, therefore, would mean placing upon the Supreme Court the duty of investigating and disciplining all these officials whose functions are plainly executive and the consequent curtailment by mere implication from the Legislative grant, of the President's power to discipline and remove administrative officials who are presidential appointees, and which the Constitution expressly place under the President's supervision and control.
	GR No. 175352 2011-01-18	DANTE V. LIBAN v. RICHARD J. GORDON LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
As correctly pointed out in respondent's Motion, the issue of constitutionality of R.A. No. 95 was not raised by the parties, and was not among the issues defined in the body of the Decision; thus, it was not the very lis mota of the case. We have reiterated the rule as to when the Court will consider the issue of constitutionality in Alvarez v. PICOP Resources, Inc.,[12] thus: This Court will not touch the issue of unconstitutionality unless it is the very lis mota. It is a well-established rule that a court should not pass upon a constitutional question and decide a law to be unconstitutional or invalid, unless such question is raised by the parties and that when it is raised, if the record also presents some other ground upon which the court may [rest] its judgment, that course will be adopted and the constitutional question will be left for consideration until such question will be unavoidable.[13]
	GR No. 162243 2009-12-03	HEHERSON ALVAREZ SUBSTITUTED BY ELISEA G. GOZUN v. PICOP RESOURCES CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
SFMS Evangelista's testimony of nonpayment of forest charges was, furthermore, based on his failure to find official receipts corresponding to billings sent to PICOP. As stated above, PICOP attached official receipts in its Addendum to Motion for Reconsideration to this Court. While this course of action is normally irregular in judicial proceedings, we merely stated in the assailed Decision that "the DENR Secretary has adequately proven that PICOP has, at this time, failed to comply with administrative and statutory requirements for the conversion of TLA No. 43 into an IFMA,"[80] and that "this disposition confers another chance to comply with the foregoing requirements."[81]
	GR No. 178799 2009-01-19	FIRST UNITED CONSTRUCTORS CORPORATION v. PORO POINT MANAGEMENT CORPORATION OF PPMC NACHURA, J.
As we explained in Alvarez v. PICOP Resources, Inc.:[18]
	GR No. 159308 2008-09-16	REPUBLIC v. PAGADIAN CITY TIMBER CO. NACHURA, J.
An IFMA has for its precursor the Timber License Agreement (TLA), one of the tenurial instruments issued by the State to its grantees for the efficient management of the country's dwindling forest resources. Jurisprudence has been consistent in holding that license agreements are not contracts within the purview of the due process and the non-impairment of contracts clauses enshrined in the Constitution. Our pronouncement in Alvarez v. PICOP Resources, Inc.[28] is enlightening -
	GR No. 152643 2008-08-28	CONCEPCION CUENCO VDA. DE MANGUERRA v. RAUL RISOS NACHURA, J.
Unlike an examination of a defense witness which, pursuant to Section 5, Rule 119 of the previous Rules, and now Section 13, Rule 119 of the present Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, may be taken before any "judge, or, if not practicable, a member of the Bar in good standing so designated by the judge in the order, or, if the order be made by a court of superior jurisdiction, before an inferior court to be designated therein," the examination of a witness for the prosecution under Section 15 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (December 1, 2000) may be done only "before the court where the case is pending."[32] Rule 119 categorically states that the conditional examination of a prosecution witness shall be made before the court where the case is pending. Contrary to petitioners' contention, there is nothing in the rule which may remotely be interpreted to mean that such requirement applies only to cases where the witness is within the jurisdiction of said court and not when he is kilometers away, as in the present case. Therefore, the court may not introduce exceptions or conditions. Neither may it engraft into the law (or the Rules) qualifications not contemplated.[33] When the words are clear and categorical, there is no room for interpretation. There is only room for application.[34]
	GR NO. 163352 2007-07-31	WT CONSTRUCTION v. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS PUNO, C.J.
Finally, we reject the contention of the pubic respondents that the filing of the present petition with this Court violates the policy on hierarchy of courts. Pursuant to the mandate of Republic Act No. 8975 (R.A. 8975), only the Supreme Court has the authority to issue a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction and preliminary mandatory injunction against the Government or any of its instrumentalities, officials and agencies in cases such as those filed by bidders or those claiming to have rights through such bidders involving such contract or project. R.A. 8975 prohibits lower courts from issuing injunctive orders in connection with the implementation of government infrastructure projects unless the case pertains to matters of extreme urgency involving constitutional issues such that unless a temporary restraining order is issued, grave injustice and irreparable injury will arise.[16] The foregoing provisions, however, do not deprive the lower courts of the authority to take cognizance of the issues raised in the principal action, as long as such action and the relief sought are within their jurisdiction.[17]