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PHILIPPINE SAVINGS BANK v. SPS. RODOLFO C. MAÑALAC

This case has been cited 6 times or more.

	GR No. 171172 2015-11-09	BANK OF PHILIPPINE ISLANDS v. SPS. JOHNSON AND EVELYN CO AND JUPITER REAL ESTATE VENTURES JARDELEZA, J.
In a Resolution dated January 9, 2012, the CA denied the motion for reconsideration of Spouses Co and Jupiter.[39] Only Spouses Co filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with Motion to Consolidate this Petition (G.R. No. 200061) with G.R. No. 171172 dated February 8, 2012.[40] Spouses Co alleged that the cases of Philippine Savings Bank v. Mañalac, Jr.,[41] Bank of Commerce v. Perlas-Bernabe[42] Sulit v. Court of Appeals,[43] and Barican v. Intermediate Appellate Court[44] should apply and the CA should have considered the peculiar circumstances of the case.[45] They claimed that there was then a petition for corporate rehabilitation pending with another court that issued a stay order.[46] Thus, the foreclosure was null and void.[47] Spouses Co further alleged that Act No. 3135 violates the Constitution since the law gives unbridled license to the court and purchaser to deprive the owner of the property without the opportunity to be heard.[48]
	GR No. 168987 2012-10-17	PHILIPPINE AIRLINES v. FRANCISCO LAO LIM PERALTA, J.
Petitioner assails the award of P50,000.00 as moral damages granted to the heirs of Henry Go despite the fact that neither Henry Go nor any of his heirs testified on matters that could be the basis for such monetary award. In Philippine Savings Bank vs. Manalac, Jr.,[11] the Court ruled, thus: x x x [T]he award of moral damages must be anchored on a clear showing that [the complainant] actually experienced mental anguish, besmirched reputation, sleepless nights, wounded feelings or similar injury. There was no better witness to this experience than [complainant] himself. Since [complainant] failed to testify on the witness stand, the trial court did not have any factual basis to award moral damages to him. x x x Mere allegations do not suffice; they must be substantiated by clear and convincing proof.[12] (Emphasis supplied)
	GR Nos. 182382-83 2010-02-24	JAIME S. DOMDOM v. THIRD CARPIO MORALES, J.
Thus, in Philippine Savings Bank v. Mañalac, Jr.,[13] the Court disregarded the technical difference between an action and a proceeding, and upheld the consolidation of a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession with an ordinary civil action in order to achieve a more expeditious resolution of the cases.
	GR No. 183211 2009-06-05	PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK v. GOTESCO TYAN MING DEVELOPMENT NACHURA, J.
PNB then filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. On March 12, 2008, the CA rendered the assailed Decision dismissing the petition. Citing Philippine Savings Bank v. Mañalac, Jr.,[10] the CA rejected PNB's argument that a petition for issuance of a writ of possession cannot be consolidated with an ordinary civil action. The CA further held that the RTC merely complied with the express mandate of Section 1, Rule 31 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in granting the motion for consolidation. Thus, it cannot be charged with grave abuse of discretion.
	GR No. 183211 2009-06-05	PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK v. GOTESCO TYAN MING DEVELOPMENT NACHURA, J.
Thus, in Philippine Savings Bank v. Mañalac, Jr.,[14] we disregarded the technical difference between an action and a proceeding, and upheld the consolidation of a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession with an ordinary civil action in order to achieve a more expeditious resolution of the cases, thus: In the instant case, the consolidation of Civil Case No. 53967 with LRC Case No. R-3951 is more in consonance with the rationale behind the consolidation of cases which is to promote a more expeditious and less expensive resolution of the controversy than if they were heard independently by separate branches of the trial court. Hence, the technical difference between Civil Case No. 53967 and LRC Case No. R-3951 must be disregarded in order to promote the ends of justice.[15]
	GR No. 174711 2008-09-17	SALLY SUENO v. LAND BANK OF PHILIPPINES CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
For this Court to sustain Sueno's position - that the LBP agreed to extend the redemption period upon her payment of an amount substantially less than what it demanded - offends the elementary principle enunciated in our jurisdiction that novation can never be presumed. As elucidated by this Court in Philippine Savings Bank v. Mañalac, Jr.[17]:Novation is never presumed, and the animus novandi, whether totally or partially, must appear by express agreement of the parties, or by their acts that are too clear and unmistakable. The extinguishment of the old obligation by the new one is a necessary element of novation, which may be effected either expressly or impliedly. The term "expressly" means that the contracting parties incontrovertibly disclose that their object in executing the new contract is to extinguish the old one. Upon the other hand, no specific form is required for an implied novation, and all that is prescribed by law would be an incompatibility between the two contracts. While there is really no hard and fast rule to determine what might constitute to be a sufficient change that can bring about novation, the touchstone for contrariety, however, would be an irreconcilable incompatibility between the old and the new obligations. (Emphasis supplied.)