This case has been cited 4 times or more.
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2010-09-01 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
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| In Mato v. Court of Appeals,[55] we concretized the above ruling by holding that evidence, although not formally offered in evidence, may be "admitted and considered by the trial court provided the following requirements are present, viz: first, the same must have been duly identified by testimony duly recorded and, second, the same must have been incorporated in the records of the case."[56] In Ramos v. Dizon,[57] we deemed the exhibits to have been incorporated into the records because they had been "presented and marked during the pre-trial of the case."[58] Likewise, the first requisite was deemed satisfied because one of the parties therein explained the contents of the exhibits when interrogated by the respondents' counsel.[59] | |||||
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2008-10-17 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| Respondents did not deny the admission made by their counsel, neither did they claim that the same was made through palpable mistake. As such, the stipulation of facts is incontrovertible and may be relied upon by the courts. The pre-trial forms part of the proceedings and matters dealt therein may not be brushed aside in the process of decision-making. Otherwise, the real essence of compulsory pre-trial would be rendered inconsequential and worthless.[31] Furthermore, an act performed by counsel within the scope of a "general or implied authority" is regarded as an act of the client which renders respondents in estoppel. By estoppel is meant that an admission or representation is conclusive upon the person making it and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying thereon.[32] | |||||
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2008-09-26 |
YNARES-SATIAGO, J. |
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| Generally, courts cannot consider evidence which has not been formally offered. Parties are required to inform the courts of the purpose of introducing their respective exhibits to assist the latter in ruling on their admissibility in case an objection thereto is made. Without a formal offer of evidence, courts are constrained to take no notice of the evidence even if it has been marked and identified.[10] However, this Court has relaxed the foregoing rule and allowed evidence not formally offered to be admitted and considered by the trial court provided the same must have been identified by testimony duly recorded and incorporated in the records of the case.[11] | |||||
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2008-04-30 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| SEC. 34. Offer of evidence. -- The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified. The CTA and the CA rely solely on the case of Vda. de Oñate, which reiterated this Court's previous rulings in People v. Napat-a[35] and People v. Mate[36] on the admission and consideration of exhibits which were not formally offered during the trial. Although in a long line of cases many of which were decided after Vda. de Oñate, we held that courts cannot consider evidence which has not been formally offered,[37] nevertheless, petitioner cannot validly assume that the doctrine laid down in Vda. de Oñate has already been abandoned. Recently, in Ramos v. Dizon,[38] this Court, applying the said doctrine, ruled that the trial court judge therein committed no error when he admitted and considered the respondents' exhibits in the resolution of the case, notwithstanding the fact that the same were not formally offered. Likewise, in Far East Bank & Trust Company v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,[39] the Court made reference to said doctrine in resolving the issues therein. Indubitably, the doctrine laid down in Vda. De Oñate still subsists in this jurisdiction. In Vda. de Oñate, we held that:From the foregoing provision, it is clear that for evidence to be considered, the same must be formally offered. Corollarily, the mere fact that a particular document is identified and marked as an exhibit does not mean that it has already been offered as part of the evidence of a party. In Interpacific Transit, Inc. v. Aviles [186 SCRA 385], we had the occasion to make a distinction between identification of documentary evidence and its formal offer as an exhibit. We said that the first is done in the course of the trial and is accompanied by the marking of the evidence as an exhibit while the second is done only when the party rests its case and not before. A party, therefore, may opt to formally offer his evidence if he believes that it will advance his cause or not to do so at all. In the event he chooses to do the latter, the trial court is not authorized by the Rules to consider the same. | |||||