This case has been cited 8 times or more.
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2015-11-11 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| Lacking, therefore, in an absolutely simulated contract is consent which is essential to a valid and enforceable contract.[13] Thus, where a person, in order to place his property beyond the reach of his creditors, simulates a transfer of it to another, he does not really intend to divest himself of his title and control of the property; hence, the deed of transfer is but a sham.[14] | |||||
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2011-09-14 |
MENDOZA, J. |
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| Two veritable legal presumptions bear on the validity of the Deed of Sale: (1) that there was sufficient consideration for the contract; and (2) that it was the result of a fair and regular private transaction. If shown to hold, these presumptions infer prima facie the transaction's validity, except that it must yield to the evidence adduced.[10] | |||||
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2011-09-14 |
MENDOZA, J. |
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| Lacking, therefore, in an absolutely simulated contract is consent which is essential to a valid and enforceable contract.[14] Thus, where a person, in order to place his property beyond the reach of his creditors, simulates a transfer of it to another, he does not really intend to divest himself of his title and control of the property; hence, the deed of transfer is but a sham.[15] Similarly, in this case, Alfonso simulated a transfer to Policronio purely for taxation purposes, without intending to transfer ownership over the subject lands. | |||||
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2011-09-14 |
MENDOZA, J. |
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| The most protuberant index of simulation of contract is the complete absence of an attempt in any manner on the part of the ostensible buyer to assert rights of ownership over the subject properties. Policronio's failure to take exclusive possession of the subject properties or, in the alternative, to collect rentals, is contrary to the principle of ownership. Such failure is a clear badge of simulation that renders the whole transaction void. [20] | |||||
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2009-10-12 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| In reversing and vacating the RTC Decision, the CA found no simulation in the contract of sale, i.e., Kasulatan. Relying on Manila Banking Corporation v. Silverio,[8] the appellate court pointed out that an absolutely simulated contract takes place when the parties do not intend at all to be bound by it, and that it is characterized by the fact that the apparent contract is not really desired or intended to produce legal effects or in any way alter the juridical situation of the parties. It read the sale contract (Kasulatan) as clear and unambiguous, for respondents (spouses Vizconde) were the buyers and petitioners (spouses Lequin) were the sellers. Such being the case, petitioners are, to the CA, the owners of the 1,012-square meter lot, and as owners they conveyed the 512-square meter portion to respondents. | |||||
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2008-07-21 |
TINGA, J, |
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| The foregoing circumstances justify the appellate court's conclusion, to which we agree, that the parties executed the Agreement with Mortgage and the Deed of Absolute Sale solely to confront the possibility that the property sold by Peñaranda to petitioner would be adjudged to another claimant. The final disposition of the quieting of title case in favor of petitioner rendered the contracts without a cause, therefore void.[17] | |||||
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2008-06-27 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| In Suntay v. Court of Appeals,[34] the Court held that the most protuberant index of simulation is the complete absence of an attempt in any manner on the part of the vendee to assert his rights of ownership over the disputed property. This pronouncement was reiterated in such cases as Sps. Santiago v. Court of Appeals,[35] Cruz v. Bancom Finance Corporation,[36] Ramos v. Heirs of Honorio Ramos, Sr.,[37] Manila Banking Corporation v. Silverio,[38] and most recently in Tating v. Marcella.[39] | |||||
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2006-06-21 |
GARCIA, J. |
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| In effect, the determinative issue tendered in this case resolves itself into the question of whether or not the Ong-Lee contract of sale partakes of a conveyance to defraud Union Bank. Obviously, this necessitates an inquiry into the facts and this Court eschews factual examination in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, save when, as in the instant case, a clash between the factual findings of the trial court and that of the appellate court exists,[6] among other exceptions. | |||||