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GLENN CABALLES Y CHUA v. CA

This case has been cited 6 times or more.

2015-04-08
LEONEN, J.
In such cases, instead of availing themselves of the extraordinary remedy of a petition for habeas corpus, persons restrained under a lawful process or order of the court must pursue the orderly course of trial and exhaust the usual remedies.[133] This ordinary remedy is to file a motion to quash the information or the warrant of arrest.[134]
2013-07-17
BERSAMIN, J.
The high prerogative writ of habeas corpus has been devised as a speedy and effective remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint.  In Caballes v. Court of Appeals,[10] the Court discoursed on the nature of the special proceeding of habeas corpus in the following manner: A petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is a special proceeding governed by Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, as amended.  In Ex Parte Billings, it was held that habeas corpus is that of a civil proceeding in character. It seeks the enforcement of civil rights. Resorting to the writ is not to inquire into the criminal act of which the complaint is made, but into the right of liberty, notwithstanding the act and the immediate purpose to be served is relief from illegal restraint. The rule applies even when instituted to arrest a criminal prosecution and secure freedom. When a prisoner petitions for a writ of habeas corpus, he thereby commences a suit and prosecutes a case in that court.
2011-01-19
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
We reiterate the well-settled rule that certiorari is not available where the aggrieved party's remedy of appeal is plain, speedy and adequate in the ordinary course, the reason being that certiorari cannot co-exist with an appeal or any other adequate remedy. The existence and availability of the right to appeal are antithetical to the availment of the special civil action for certiorari. These two remedies are mutually exclusive.[17]  The special civil action of certiorari cannot be used as a substitute for an appeal which the petitioner already lost.[18]
2010-11-17
PEREZ, J.
In G.R. No. 170410, on the other hand, we find that petitioner Francisco is similarly out on a limb in insisting that the Lucena RTC gravely abused its discretion in upholding the Sariaya MTC's denial of his motion to dismiss Criminal Case No. 01-99 on the ground that his constitutional right to a speedy trial has been violated. Designed to prevent the oppression of the citizen by holding criminal prosecution suspended over him for an indefinite time and to prevent delays in the administration of justice, said right is considered violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays.[61] In the case of Corpuz vs. Sandiganbayan,[62] this Court significantly ruled as follows: "While justice is administered with dispatch, the essential ingredient is orderly, expeditious and not mere speed. It cannot be definitely said how long is too long in a system where justice is supposed to be swift, but deliberate. It is consistent with delays and depends upon circumstances. It secures rights to the accused, but it does not preclude the rights of public justice. Also, it must be borne in mind that the rights given to the accused by the Constitution and the Rules of Court are shields, not weapons; hence, courts are to give meaning to that intent.
2007-10-10
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
While the Court may treat a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 as having been filed under Rule 45 to serve the higher interest of justice, such liberal application of the rules finds no application if the petition is filed well beyond the reglementary period for filing a petition for review without any reason therefor.[28]
2006-02-27
CALLEJO, SR., J.
On the merits of the petition, we find and so rule that the CA acted in accord with jurisprudence when it affirmed the assailed Order of the RTC dismissing the Petition for Habeas Corpus. As the Court held in Caballes v. Court of Appeals,[32]