This case has been cited 10 times or more.
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2016-01-13 |
VILLARAMA, JR., J. |
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| The Court thus declared in Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Melicor,[26] that it will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts, and exceptional and compelling circumstances, such as cases of national interest and of serious implications, justify the availment of the extraordinary remedy of writ of certiorari, calling for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction.[27] | |||||
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2014-07-01 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
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| Although similar to prohibition in that it will lie for want or excess of jurisdiction, certiorari is to be distinguished from prohibition by the fact that it is a corrective remedy used for the re-examination of some action of an inferior tribunal, and is directed to the cause or proceeding in the lower court and not to the court itself, while prohibition is a preventative remedy issuing to restrain future action, and is directed to the court itself.[32] The Court expounded on the nature and function of the writ of prohibition in Holy Spirit Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Defensor:[33] | |||||
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2012-06-13 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| On March 6, 2012, the Comelec issued Resolution No. 9373[8] resolving to seriously consider exercising the OTP subject to certain conditions. On March 21, 2012, the Comelec issued Resolution No. 9376[9] resolving to exercise the OTP the PCOS and CCS hardware and software in accordance with the AES contract between the Comelec and Smartmatic-TIM in connection with the May 10, 2010 elections subject to the following conditions: (1) the warranties agreed upon in the AES contract shall be in full force and effect; (2) the original price for the hardware and software covered by the OTP as specified in the AES contract shall be maintained, excluding the cost of the 920 units of PCOS and related peripherals previously purchased for use in the 2010 special elections; and (3) all other services related to the 2013 AES shall be subject to public bidding. On March 29, 2012, the Comelec issued Resolution No. 9377[10] resolving to accept Smartmatic-TIM's offer to extend the period to exercise the OTP until March 31, 2012 and to authorize Chairman Brillantes to sign for and on behalf of the Comelec the Agreement on the Extension of the OTP Under the AES Contract[11] (Extension Agreement, for brevity). The aforesaid Extension Agreement was signed on March 30, 2012.[12] On even date, the Comelec issued Resolution No. 9378[13] resolving to approve the Deed of Sale between the Comelec and Smartmatic-TIM to purchase the latter's PCOS machines (hardware and software) to be used in the upcoming May 2013 elections and to authorize Chairman Brillantes to sign the Deed of Sale for and on behalf of the Comelec. The Deed of Sale[14] was forthwith executed. | |||||
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2012-02-07 |
SERENO, J. |
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| Neither is a petition for prohibition appropriate in this case. A petition for prohibition is filed against any tribunal, corporation, board, or person whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions who has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, and the petitioner prays that judgment be rendered, commanding the respondent to desist from further proceeding in the action or matter specified in the petition.[11] However, prohibition only lies against judicial or ministerial functions, but not against legislative or quasi-legislative functions.[12] | |||||
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2011-06-07 |
CARPIO MORALES, J. |
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| Holy Spirit Homeowners' Association v. Defensor [4] expounds on prohibition as a remedy to assail executive issuances: A petition for prohibition is also not the proper remedy to assail an IRR issued in the exercise of a quasi-legislative function. Prohibition is an extraordinary writ directed against any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, ordering said entity or person to desist from further proceedings when said proceedings are without or in excess of said entity's or person's jurisdiction, or are accompanied with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Prohibition lies against judicial or ministerial functions, but not against legislative or quasi-legislative functions. Generally, the purpose of a writ of prohibition is to keep a lower court within the limits of its jurisdiction in order to maintain the administration of justice in orderly channels. Prohibition is the proper remedy to afford relief against usurpation of jurisdiction or power by an inferior court, or when, in the exercise of jurisdiction in handling matters clearly within its cognizance the inferior court transgresses the bounds prescribed to it by the law, or where there is no adequate remedy available in the ordinary course of law by which such relief can be obtained. Where the principal relief sought is to invalidate an IRR, petitioners' remedy is an ordinary action for its nullification, an action which properly falls under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. In any case, petitioners' allegation that "respondents are performing or threatening to perform functions without or in excess of their jurisdiction" may appropriately be enjoined by the trial court through a writ of injunction or a temporary restraining order. (emphasis supplied) | |||||
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2010-03-26 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| Holy Spirit Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Defensor[6] held: Where a rule or regulation has a provision not expressly stated or contained in the statute being implemented, that provision does not necessarily contradict the statute. A legislative rule is in the nature of subordinate legislation, designed to implement a primary legislation by providing the details thereof. All that is required is that the regulation should be germane to the objects and purposes of the law; that the regulation be not in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by the law.[7] | |||||
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2010-03-09 |
CORONA, J. |
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| Legal standing or locus standi is a party's personal and substantial interest in a case such that it has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act being challenged.[16] In Holy Spirit Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Defensor,[17] we held that the association had legal standing because its members stood to be injured by the enforcement of the assailed provisions: Petitioner association has the legal standing to institute the instant petition xxx. There is no dispute that the individual members of petitioner association are residents of the NGC. As such they are covered and stand to be either benefited or injured by the enforcement of the IRR, particularly as regards the selection process of beneficiaries and lot allocation to qualified beneficiaries. Thus, petitioner association may assail those provisions in the IRR which it believes to be unfavorable to the rights of its members. xxx Certainly, petitioner and its members have sustained direct injury arising from the enforcement of the IRR in that they have been disqualified and eliminated from the selection process.[18] | |||||
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2010-02-10 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| Respondents, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, argue that rules and regulations have the force and effect of law as long as they are germane to the objects and purposes of the law. They contend that the exemption from the land area requirement of 2,000 square kilometers is germane to the purpose of the Local Government Code to develop political and territorial subdivisions into self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the attainment of national goals.[23] They assert that in Holy Spirit Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Defensor,[24] the Court declared as valid the implementing rules and regulations of a statute, even though the administrative agency added certain provisions in the implementing rules that were not found in the law. | |||||
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2009-04-02 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| The rule, however, is not absolute, as when exceptional and compelling circumstances justify the exercise of this Court of its primary jurisdiction. In this case, petitioner alleges that EO 566 expands the coverage of RA 7722 and in doing so, the Executive Department usurps the legislative powers of Congress. The issue in this case is not only the validity of the RIRR. Otherwise, the proper remedy of petitioner and petitioners-intervenors would have been an ordinary action for the nullification of the RIRR before the Regional Trial Court.[21] The alleged violation of the Constitution by the Executive Department when it issued EO 566 justifies the exercise by the Court of its primary jurisdiction over the case. The Court is not precluded from brushing aside technicalities and taking cognizance of an action due to its importance to the public and in keeping with its duty to determine whether the other branches of the Government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution.[22] | |||||