This case has been cited 4 times or more.
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2013-09-04 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
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| The letter of Wagas did not competently establish that he was the person who had conversed with Ligaray by telephone to place the order for the rice. The letter was admitted exclusively as the State's rebuttal evidence to controvert or impeach the denial of Wagas of entering into any transaction with Ligaray on the rice; hence, it could be considered and appreciated only for that purpose. Under the law of evidence, the court shall consider evidence solely for the purpose for which it is offered,[38] not for any other purpose.[39] Fairness to the adverse party demands such exclusivity. Moreover, the high plausibility of the explanation of Wagas that he had signed the letter only because his sister and her husband had pleaded with him to do so could not be taken for granted. | |||||
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2007-08-28 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| A contrary view would be inimical to the greater interest of dispensing justice. For all that a losing party will do is to invoke the mistake or negligence of his counsel as a ground for reversing or setting aside a judgment adverse to him, thereby putting no end to litigation.[40] To allow this obnoxious practice would be to put a premium on the willful and intentional commission of errors by accused persons and their counsel, with a view to securing new trials in the event of conviction.[41] | |||||
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2006-09-05 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| Every counsel has the implied authority to do all acts which are necessary or, at least, incidental to the prosecution and management of the suit in behalf of his client. And, any act performed by counsel within the scope of his general and implied authority is, in the eyes of the law, regarded as the act of the client himself and consequently, the mistake or negligence of the client's counsel may result in the rendition of an unfavorable judgment against him.[37] To rule otherwise would result to a situation that every defeated party, in order to salvage his case, would just have to claim neglect or mistake on the part of his counsel as a ground for reversing the adverse judgment. There would be no end to litigation if this were allowed as every shortcoming of counsel could be the subject of challenge by his client through another counsel who, if he is also found wanting, would likewise be disowned by the same client through another counsel, and so on ad infinitum. This would render court proceedings indefinite, tentative and subject to reopening at any time by the mere subterfuge of replacing counsel.[38] | |||||
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2005-11-11 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| Consequently, petitioners' defense that they have a better right over the subject land because they had been in open, public, adverse, continuous, and uninterrupted possession in the concept of owner for more than 30 years must be struck down. Section 47 of P.D. No. 1529 provides that "[n]o title to registered land in derogation of the title of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession." The ruling in Ragudo vs. Fabella Estate Tenants Association, Inc.,[19] is exactly in point, to wit:... In a long line of cases, we have consistently ruled that lands covered by a title cannot be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. So it is that in Natalia Realty Corporation vs. Vallez, et al., we held that a claim of acquisitive prescription is baseless when the land involved is a registered land because of Article 1126 of the Civil Code in relation to Act 496 (now, Section 47 of Presidential Decree No. 1529): | |||||