This case has been cited 6 times or more.
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2008-07-28 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| Moreover, the petitioners, not the respondents, have the burden of proving that the quitclaim was voluntarily entered into.[36] In previous cases, we have considered, among others, the educational attainment of the employees concerned in upholding the validity of the quitclaims which they have executed in favor of their employers.[37] However, in Becton Dickinson Phils., Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission,[38] we held:There is no nexus between intelligence, or even the position which the employee held in the company when it concerns the pressure which the employer may exert upon the free will of the employee who is asked to sign a release and quitclaim. A lowly employee or a sales manager, as in the present case, who is confronted with the same dilemma of whether signing a release and quitclaim and accept what the company offers them, or refusing to sign and walk out without receiving anything, may do succumb to the same pressure, being very well aware that it is going to take quite a while before he can recover whatever he is entitled to, because it is only after a protracted legal battle starting from the labor arbiter level, all the way to this Court, can he receive anything at all. The Court understands that such a risk of not receiving anything whatsoever, coupled with the probability of not immediately getting any gainful employment or means of livelihood in the meantime, constitutes enough pressure upon anyone who is asked to sign a release and quitclaim in exchange of some amount of money which may be way below what he may be entitled to based on company practice and policy or by law. | |||||
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2008-07-23 |
YNARES-SATIAGO, J. |
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| That FASAP admitted and took for granted the existence of PAL's financial woes cannot excuse the latter from proving to the Court's satisfaction that indeed it was bleeding financially. It was the airline's obligation to prove that it was in such financial distress; that it was necessary to implement an appropriate retrenchment scheme; that it had to undergo a retrenchment program in proportion to or commensurate with the extent of its financial distress; and that, it was carrying out the scheme in good faith and without undermining the security of tenure of its employees. The Court is mindful that the characterization of an employee's services as no longer necessary or sustainable, and therefore, properly terminable, is an exercise of business judgment on the part of the employer, and that the wisdom or soundness of such characterization or decision is not subject to discretionary review, provided of course that violation of law or arbitrary or malicious action is not shown.[82] | |||||
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2008-03-14 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| We reiterate the dictum that this Court is not a trier of facts, and this doctrine applies with greater force in labor cases. Factual questions are for the labor tribunals to resolve. In this case, the factual issues were resolved by the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC. Their findings were affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Judicial review by this Court does not extend to a reevaluation of the sufficiency of the evidence upon which the proper labor tribunal has based its determination.[17] | |||||
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2007-10-15 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| Private respondent was dismissed by petitioner on the ground of redundancy, one of the authorized causes for dismissal under Article 283 of the Labor Code, to wit: Article 283. Closure of establishment and reduction of personnel.- The employer may also terminate the employment of any employee due to the installment of labor saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or cessation of operation of the establishment or undertaking unless the closing is for the purpose of circumventing the provisions of this Title, by serving a written notice on the workers and the Ministry of Labor and Employment at least one (1) month before the intended date thereof. In case of termination due to the installation of labor saving devices or redundancy, the worker affected thereby shall be entitled to a separation pay equivalent to at least one (1) month pay or to at least one (1) month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. In case of retrenchment to prevent losses and in cases of closures or cessation of operations of establishment or undertaking not due to serious business losses or reverses, the separation pay shall be equivalent to one (1) month pay or at least one half (1/2) month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. A fraction of at least six (6) months shall be considered one (1) whole year (emphasis supplied). In Becton Dickinson Phils., Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission,[13] citing the leading case, Wiltshire File Co., Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission,[14] we explained the nature of redundancy as an authorized cause for dismissal in the following manner: x x x redundancy in an employer's personnel force necessarily or even ordinarily refers to duplication of work. That no other person was holding the same position that private respondent held prior to the termination of his services, does not show that his position had not become redundant. Indeed, in any well organized business enterprise, it would be surprising to find duplication of work and two (2) or more people doing the work of one person. We believe that redundancy, for purposes of the Labor Code, exists where the services of an employee are in excess of what is reasonably demanded by the actual requirements of the enterprise. Succinctly put, a position is redundant where it is superfluous, and superfluity of a position or positions may be the outcome of a number of factors, such as overhiring of workers, decrease in volume of business, or dropping of a particular product line or service activity previously manufactured or undertaken by the enterprise.[15] We are mindful of the rule that the characterization of an employee's services as no longer necessary or sustainable, and therefore, properly terminable, is an exercise of business judgment on the part of the employer, and that the wisdom or soundness of such characterization or decision is not subject to discretionary review. However, such characterization may be rejected if the same is found to be in violation of law or is arbitrary or malicious.[16] | |||||
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2006-07-12 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| The Labor Arbiter and the NLRC have already determined the factual issues, and these were affirmed by the CA. Thus, they are accorded not only great respect but also finality,[14] and are deemed binding upon this Court so long as they are supported by substantial evidence.[15] A heavy burden rests upon petitioner to convince the Court that it should take exception from such a settled rule.[16] | |||||
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2006-06-27 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| Whether or not the Court a quo erred and committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the payment of separation pay and full backwages to the respondent?[15] At the outset, it should be stated that under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be raised, the reason being that this Court is not a trier of facts. It is not for this Court to reexamine and reevaluate the evidence on record.[16] However, considering that the CA came up with an opinion different from that of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, the Court is now constrained to review the evidence on record.[17] | |||||