This case has been cited 8 times or more.
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2015-12-07 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| Moreover, even if such affidavit is considered as admissible and the testimony of an expert witness, the Court is not bound by such testimony. As ruled in Ilao-Quianay v. Mapile:[20] | |||||
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2013-03-13 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| Veritably, it is a settled rule in our jurisdiction that a notarized document has in its favor the presumption of regularity and it carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to its due execution. It is admissible in evidence and is entitled to full faith and credit upon its face.[11] Having been prepared and acknowledged before a notary public, the said Deed is vested with public interest, the sanctity of which deserves to be upheld unless overwhelmed by clear and convincing evidence.[12] Thus, the donation made by the Vasquez couple is a valid exercise of their right as owners of the subject property and respondents are legally entitled to the said property as donees. | |||||
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2010-06-29 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| Jurisprudence dictates that factual findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the appellate court, are accorded the highest degree of respect and are considered conclusive between the parties.[7] A review of such findings by this Court is not warranted except for highly meritorious circumstances when: (1) the findings of a trial court are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) a lower court's inference from its factual findings is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts; (4) the findings of the appellate court go beyond the issues of the case, or fail to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, will justify a different conclusion; (5) there is a misappreciation of facts; (6) the findings of fact are conclusions without mention of the specific evidence on which they are based, are premised on the absence of evidence, or are contradicted by evidence on record.[8] None of the foregoing exceptions which would warrant a reversal of the assailed decision obtains in this instance. | |||||
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2009-06-22 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| Well-entrenched in jurisprudence is the rule that factual findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the appellate court, are accorded the highest degree of respect and are considered conclusive between the parties.[9] A review of such findings by this Court is not warranted except upon a showing of highly meritorious circumstances, such as: (1) when the findings of a trial court are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when a lower court's inference from its factual findings is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts; (4) when the findings of the appellate court go beyond the issues of the case, or fail to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, will justify a different conclusion; (5) when there is a misappreciation of facts; (6) when the findings of fact are conclusions without mention of the specific evidence on which they are based, are premised on the absence of evidence, or are contradicted by evidence on record.[10] None of these exceptions necessitating a reversal of the assailed decision obtains in this instance. | |||||
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2008-03-03 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| We uphold the well-entrenched rule that factual findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the appellate court, are accorded the highest degree of respect and are considered conclusive between the parties.[5] The rule, however, is not absolute and admits of exceptions upon a showing of highly meritorious circumstances, such as: (1) when the findings of a trial court are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when a lower court's inference from its factual findings is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts; (4) when the findings of the appellate court go beyond the issues of the case, or fail to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, will justify a different conclusion; (5) when there is a misappreciation of facts; (6) when the findings of fact are conclusions without mention of the specific evidence on which they are based, are premised on the absence of evidence, or are contradicted by evidence on record.[6] None of the laid down exceptions which would warrant a reversal of the assailed decision obtain herein. | |||||
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2008-01-28 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| Well-entrenched in jurisprudence is the rule that factual findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the appellate court, are accorded the highest degree of respect and are considered conclusive between the parties.[7] A review of such findings by this Court is not warranted except upon a showing of highly meritorious circumstances, such as: (1) when the findings of a trial court are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when a lower court's inference from its factual findings is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts; (4) when the findings of the appellate court go beyond the issues of the case, or fail to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, will justify a different conclusion; (5) when there is a misappreciation of facts; (6) when the findings of fact are conclusions without mention of the specific evidence on which they are based, are premised on the absence of evidence, or are contradicted by evidence on record.[8] None of the foregoing exceptions which would warrant a reversal of the assailed decision obtains in this instance. | |||||
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2007-09-28 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| At the outset, it bears to reiterate the settled rule that under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review before this Court.[6] However, this Rule is not absolute; it admits of exceptions, such as: (1) when the findings of a trial court are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when a lower court's inference from its factual findings is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts; (4) when the findings of the appellate court go beyond the issues of the case, run contrary to the admissions of the parties to the case, or fail to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, will justify a different conclusion; (5) when there is a misappreciation of facts; (6) when the findings of fact are conclusions without mention of the specific evidence on which they are based, are premised on the absence of evidence, or are contradicted by evidence on record.[7] This Court finds that the present case falls under the third and sixth exceptions for reasons discussed hereunder. | |||||
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2006-07-11 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| Finally, with respect to the credibility of the handwriting expert, courts are not bound to give probative value or evidentiary value to the opinions of handwriting experts, as resort to handwriting experts is not mandatory.[12] The courts may place whatever weight they choose upon such testimonies in accordance with the facts of the case.[13] | |||||