This case has been cited 3 times or more.
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2014-10-14 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| At any rate, even assuming that the payment of loyalty award is unwarranted, as to the employees who received the same without participating in the approval thereof, they cannot be said to be either in bad faith or grossly negligent in so doing.[44] The imprimatur given by the approving officers on such award certainly gave it a color of legality from the perspective of these employees.[45] Being in good faith, they cannot, following Blaquera v. Alcala,[46] be compelled to refund the benefits already granted to them,[47] to wit: Considering, however, that all the parties here acted in good faith, we cannot countenance the refund of subject incentive benefits for the year 1992, which amounts the petitioners have already received. Indeed, no indicia of bad faith can be detected under the attendant facts and circumstances. The officials and chiefs of offices concerned disbursed such incentive benefits in the honest belief that the amounts given were due to the recipients and the latter accepted the same with gratitude, confident that they richly deserve such benefits.[48] | |||||
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2012-09-18 |
PERLAS-BERNABE, J. |
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| In the present case, and in line with the pronouncements in Casal v. Commission on Audit[31] and Blaquera v. Alcala,[32] the Court finds that AO 161 was issued in the valid exercise of presidential control over the executive departments, which Chairman Velasco was duty bound to observe. "Executive officials who are subordinate to the President should not trifle with the President's constitutional power of control over the executive branch. There is only one Chief Executive who directs and controls the entire executive branch, and all other executive officials must implement in good faith his directives and orders. This is necessary to provide order, efficiency and coherence in carrying out the plans, policies and programs of the executive branch."[33] | |||||
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2012-09-18 |
PERLAS-BERNABE, J. |
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| Indeed, a public officer is presumed to have acted in good faith in the performance of his duties.[36] However, public officials can be held personally accountable for acts claimed to have been performed in connection with official duties where they have acted beyond their scope of authority or where there is a showing of bad faith.[37] Thus, in the case of Casal v. Commission on Audit,[38] the Court held liable the approving officers who authorized the grant of productivity award in complete disregard of the prohibition declared by a presidential issuance, ratiocinating that: The failure of petitioners-approving officers to observe all these issuances cannot be deemed a mere lapse consistent with the presumption of good faith. Rather, even if the grant of the incentive award were not for a dishonest purpose as they claimed, the patent disregard of the issuances of the President and the directives of the COA amounts to gross negligence, making them liable for the refund thereof. | |||||