This case has been cited 5 times or more.
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2012-06-25 |
REYES, J. |
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| The case of First Women's Credit Corporation v. Perez,[24] succinctly summarizes the general rules relative to criminal prosecution: that criminal prosecution may not be restrained or stayed by injunction, preliminary or final, albeit in extreme cases, exceptional circumstances have been recognized; that courts follow the policy of non-interference in the conduct of preliminary investigations by the DOJ, and of leaving to the investigating prosecutor sufficient latitude of discretion in the determination of what constitutes sufficient evidence as will establish probable cause for the filing of an information against a supposed offender; and, that the court's duty in an appropriate case is confined to a determination of whether the assailed executive or judicial determination of probable cause was done without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to want of jurisdiction. | |||||
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2009-11-25 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| This Court is guided by First Women's Credit Corporation and Shig Katamaya v. Hon. Hernando B. Perez et. al,[38] where this Court emphasized the executive nature of preliminary investigations, to wit: x x x the determination of probable cause for the filing of an information in court is an executive function, one that properly pertains at the first instance to the public prosecutor and, ultimately, to the Secretary of Justice. For this reason, the Court considers it sound judicial policy to refrain from interfering in the conduct of preliminary investigations and to leave the Department of Justice ample latitude of discretion in the determination of what constitutes sufficient evidence to establish probable cause for the prosecution of supposed offenders. Consistent with this policy, courts do not reverse the Secretary of Justice's findings and conclusions on the matter of probable cause except in clear cases of grave abuse of discretion. Thus, petitioners will prevail only if they can show that the CA erred in not holding that public respondent's resolutions were tainted with grave abuse of discretion.[39] | |||||
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2009-07-23 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| In First Women's Credit Corporation v. Perez,[28] we defined grave abuse of discretion as: By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment which is equivalent to an excess or lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility. | |||||
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2009-07-13 |
CARPIO MORALES, J. |
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| The Court held in First Women's Credit Corporation v. Perez that:[13] | |||||
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2009-03-13 |
TINGA, J. |
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| As a rule, the Court considers it sound judicial policy to refrain from interfering in the conduct of preliminary investigations and to leave the Department of Justice ample latitude of discretion in the determination of what constitutes sufficient evidence to establish probable cause for the prosecution of supposed offenders.Consistent with this policy, courts do not reverse the Secretary of Justice's findings and conclusions on the matter of probable cause except in clear cases of grave abuse of discretion.[30] | |||||