This case has been cited 5 times or more.
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2012-08-15 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
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| First of all, a fundamental principle in land registration under the Torrens system is that a certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein.[12] The certificate of title thus becomes the best proof of ownership of a parcel of land;[13] hence, anyone who deals with property registered under the Torrens system may rely on the title and need not go beyond the title.[14] This reliance on the certificate of title rests on the doctrine of indefeasibility of the land title, which has long been well-settled in this jurisdiction. It is only when the acquisition of the title is attended with fraud or bad faith that the doctrine of indefeasibility finds no application.[15] | |||||
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2007-09-07 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| At the outset, we note that issues of ownership and possession of several lots included in the 18 parcels of land covering the Banilad Friar Lands Estate had been the subject of earlier controversies which we already had occasion to rule upon. Lot Nos. 932 and 939 were the subject of Valdehueza v. Republic[13] which is ubiquitously invoked by the Republic in this case. Republic v. Lim[14] dealt with the special circumstances surrounding the incomplete and ineffectual expropriation of Lot No. 932. On the other hand, Federated Realty Corporation v. Court of Appeals[15] preliminarily determined the state of ownership and possession of a portion of Lot No. 933, particularly Lot 3, covered by TCT No. 119929. | |||||
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2006-11-29 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| Second. Antero's certificates of title, as found by the trial court and sustained by the appellate court, were issued as early as 22 October 1959. Time and again, we have upheld the fundamental principle in land registration that a certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein. It becomes the best proof of ownership of a parcel of land.[78] The validity of Antero's titles were upheld by the court a quo and the Court of Appeals and were not found to be tainted with any defect. Even as Enrique possessed certificates of title over certain portions of the subject properties, these were issued only on 7 March 1973 and 6 March 1991. On this matter, we do not find basis to digress from the ruling articulated by the Court of Appeals, to wit:Well-established is the principle that the person holding a prior certificate is entitled to the land as against a person who relies on a subsequent certificate. This rule refers to the date of the certificate of title. Absent any muniment of title issued prior to 1959 in favor of appellants [Enrique, et al.] which could prove their ownership over the contested lots, this Court is left with no other alternative but to declare appellants' claim over the properties as void.[79] | |||||
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2006-09-27 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| (c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual. Otherwise stated, for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction to issue, the following requisites must be present, to wit: (1) the existence of a clear and unmistakable right that must be protected, and (2) an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.[67] Indubitably, this Court has likewise stressed that the very foundation of the jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction rests in the existence of a cause of action and in the probability of irreparable injury, inadequacy of pecuniary compensation and the prevention of multiplicity of suits.[68] Sine dubio, the grant or denial of a writ of preliminary injunction in a pending case rests in the sound discretion of the court taking cognizance of the case since the assessment and evaluation of evidence towards that end involve findings of facts left to the said court for its conclusive determination.[69] Hence, the exercise of judicial discretion by a court in injunctive matters must not be interfered with except when there is grave abuse of discretion. [70] Grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of writs of preliminary injunction implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment that is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice or personal aversion amounting to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all in contemplation of law.[71] | |||||
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2006-08-07 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| Second. Antero's certificates of title, as found by the trial court and sustained by the appellate court, were issued as early as 22 October 1959. Time and again, we have upheld the fundamental principle in land registration that a certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein. It becomes the best proof of ownership of a parcel of land.[78] The validity of Antero's titles were upheld by the court a quo and the Court of Appeals and were not found to be tainted with any defect. Even as Enrique possessed certificates of title over certain portions of the subject properties, these were issued only on 7 March 1973 and 6 March 1991. On this matter, we do not find basis to digress from the ruling articulated by the Court of Appeals, to wit:Well-established is the principle that the person holding a prior certificate is entitled to the land as against a person who relies on a subsequent certificate. This rule refers to the date of the certificate of title. Absent any muniment of title issued prior to 1959 in favor of appellants [Enrique, et al.] which could prove their ownership over the contested lots, this Court is left with no other alternative but to declare appellants' claim over the properties as void.[79] | |||||