Lawyerly

GR No. 191672

2014-11-25

BERSAMIN, J.

Apart from violating the prohibition against holding multiple offices, Duque's designation as member of the governing Boards of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF impairs the independence of the CSC. Under Section 17,[42] Article VII of the Constitution, the President exercises control over all government offices in the Executive Branch. An office that is legally not under the control of the President is not part of the Executive Branch.[43] The Court has aptly explained in Rufino v. Endriga:[44]

GR No. 208566

2013-11-19

GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

While the previous "Congressional Pork Barrel" was apparently discontinued in 1972 after Martial Law was declared, an era when "one man controlled the legislature,"[19] the reprieve was only temporary. By 1982, the Batasang Pambansa had already introduced a new item in the General Appropriations Act (GAA) called the "Support for Local Development Projects" (SLDP) under the article on "National Aid to Local Government Units". Based on reports,[20] it was under the SLDP that the practice of giving lump-sum allocations to individual legislators began, with each assemblyman receiving P500,000.00. Thereafter, assemblymen would communicate their project preferences to the Ministry of Budget and Management for approval. Then, the said ministry would release the allocation papers to the Ministry of Local Governments, which would, in turn, issue the checks to the city or municipal treasurers in the assemblyman's locality. It has been further reported that "Congressional Pork Barrel" projects under the SLDP also began to cover not only public works projects, or so-called "hard projects", but also "soft projects",[21] or non-public works projects such as those which would fall under the categories of, among others, education, health and livelihood.[22]

GR No. 189028

2013-07-16

NATIONAL ARTIST FOR LITERATURE VIRGILIO ALMARIO v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.

It is an opportune time for the Court to assert its role as republican schoolmaster,[69] a teacher in a vital national seminar.[70] There are times when the controversy is of such character that, to prevent its recurrence and to assure respect for constitutional limitations, this Court must pass on the merits of a case.[71] This is one such case. More than being a teaching moment, this is not the first time that the Order of National Artists was conferred in the manner that is being assailed in this case.[72] If not addressed here and now, there is great probability that the central question involved in this case will haunt us again in the future. Every President may invoke absolute presidential prerogative and thrust upon us National Artists after his or her own heart, in total disregard of the advise of the CCP and the NCCA and the voice of the community of artists, resulting to repeated episodes of indignation and uproar from the artists and the public.

GR No. 177131

2011-06-07

BOY SCOUTS OF PHILIPPINES v. COA

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.

The BSP contends that Republic Act No. 7278 introduced crucial amendments to its charter; hence, the findings of the Court in Boy Scouts of the Philippines v. National Labor Relations Commission are no longer valid as the government has ceased to play a controlling influence in it. The BSP claims that the pronouncements of the Court therein must be taken only within the context of that case; that the Court had categorically found that its assets were acquired from the Boy Scouts of America and not from the Philippine government, and that its operations are financed chiefly from membership dues of the Boy Scouts themselves as well as from property rentals; and that "the BSP may correctly be characterized as non-governmental, and hence, beyond the audit jurisdiction of the COA." It further claims that the designation by the Court of the BSP as a government agency or instrumentality is mere obiter dictum. [20]

GR No. 182574

2010-09-28

PROVINCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL v. COMMISSIONERS

CARPIO, J.

The President's power of general supervision means the power of a superior officer to see to it that subordinates perform their functions according to law.[14] This is distinguished from the President's power of control which is the power to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the President over that of the subordinate officer.[15] The power of control gives the President the power to revise or reverse the acts or decisions of a subordinate officer involving the exercise of discretion.[16]

GR No. 178158

2009-12-04

STRATEGIC ALLIANCE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. RADSTOCK SECURITIES LIMITED

CARPIO, J.

Not being a government corporation created by special law, PNCC does not owe its creation to some charter or special law, but to the Corporation Code. Its powers are enumerated in the Corporation Code and its articles of incorporation. As an autonomous entity, it undoubtedly has the power to compromise, and to enter into a settlement through its Board of Directors, just like any other private corporation organized under the Corporation Code. To maintain otherwise is to ignore the character of PNCC as a corporate entity organized under the Corporation Code, by which it was vested with a personality and identity distinct and separate from those of its stockholders or members. (Boldfacing and underlining supplied) The Dissenting Opinion is woefully wide off the mark. The PNCC is not "just like any other private corporation" precisely because it is not a private corporation but indisputably a government owned corporation. Neither is PNCC "an autonomous entity" considering that PNCC is under the Department of Trade and Industry, over which the President exercises control. To claim that PNCC is an "autonomous entity" is to say that it is a lost command in the Executive branch, a concept that violates the President's constitutional power of control over the entire Executive branch of government.[56]

GR No. 175352

2009-07-15

DANTE V. LIBAN v. RICHARD J. GORDON

CARPIO, J.

Under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution,[14] the President appoints all officials and employees in the Executive branch whose appointments are vested in the President by the Constitution or by law. The President also appoints those whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law. Under this Section 16, the law may also authorize the "heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards" to appoint officers lower in rank than such heads of departments, agencies, commissions or boards.[15] In Rufino v. Endriga,[16] the Court explained appointments under Section 16 in this wise: Under Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, the President appoints three groups of officers. The first group refers to the heads of the Executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in the President by the Constitution. The second group refers to those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint. The third group refers to all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law.

GR No. 170338

2008-12-23

GARCILLANO v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC INFORMATION

NACHURA, J.

The Court, however, dismisses G.R. No. 170338 for being moot and academic. Repeatedly stressed in our prior decisions is the principle that the exercise by this Court of judicial power is limited to the determination and resolution of actual cases and controversies.[35] By actual cases, we mean existing conflicts appropriate or ripe for judicial determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, for otherwise the decision of the Court will amount to an advisory opinion. The power of judicial inquiry does not extend to hypothetical questions because any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities.[36] Neither will the Court determine a moot question in a case in which no practical relief can be granted. A case becomes moot when its purpose has become stale.[37] It is unnecessary to indulge in academic discussion of a case presenting a moot question as a judgment thereon cannot have any practical legal effect or, in the nature of things, cannot be enforced.[38]

GR No. 178830

2008-07-14

ROLEX SUPLICO v. NATIONAL ECONOMIC

REYES, R.T., J.

Petitioner Suplico cites this Court's rulings in Gonzales v. Chavez,[6] Rufino v. Endriga,[7] and Alunan III v. Mirasol[8] that despite their mootness, the Court nevertheless took cognizance of these cases and ruled on the merits due to the Court's symbolic function of educating the bench and the bar by formulating guiding and controlling principles, precepts, doctrines, and rules.

GR No. 168338

2008-02-15

FRANCISCO CHAVEZ v. RAUL M. GONZALES

PUNO, C.J.

Freedom of expression has gained recognition as a fundamental principle of every democratic government, and given a preferred right that stands on a higher level than substantive economic freedom or other liberties. The cognate rights codified by Article III, Section 4 of the Constitution, copied almost verbatim from the First Amendment of the U.S. Bill of Rights,[25] were considered the necessary consequence of republican institutions and the complement of free speech.[26] This preferred status of free speech has also been codified at the international level, its recognition now enshrined in international law as a customary norm that binds all nations.[27]

	GR No. 191672 2014-11-25	DENNIS A. B. FUNA v. CHAIRMAN BERSAMIN, J.
Apart from violating the prohibition against holding multiple offices, Duque's designation as member of the governing Boards of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF impairs the independence of the CSC. Under Section 17,[42] Article VII of the Constitution, the President exercises control over all government offices in the Executive Branch. An office that is legally not under the control of the President is not part of the Executive Branch.[43] The Court has aptly explained in Rufino v. Endriga:[44]
	GR No. 208566 2013-11-19	GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
While the previous "Congressional Pork Barrel" was apparently discontinued in 1972 after Martial Law was declared, an era when "one man controlled the legislature,"[19] the reprieve was only temporary. By 1982, the Batasang Pambansa had already introduced a new item in the General Appropriations Act (GAA) called the "Support for Local Development Projects" (SLDP) under the article on "National Aid to Local Government Units". Based on reports,[20] it was under the SLDP that the practice of giving lump-sum allocations to individual legislators began, with each assemblyman receiving P500,000.00. Thereafter, assemblymen would communicate their project preferences to the Ministry of Budget and Management for approval. Then, the said ministry would release the allocation papers to the Ministry of Local Governments, which would, in turn, issue the checks to the city or municipal treasurers in the assemblyman's locality. It has been further reported that "Congressional Pork Barrel" projects under the SLDP also began to cover not only public works projects, or so-called "hard projects", but also "soft projects",[21] or non-public works projects such as those which would fall under the categories of, among others, education, health and livelihood.[22]
	GR No. 189028 2013-07-16	NATIONAL ARTIST FOR LITERATURE VIRGILIO ALMARIO v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
It is an opportune time for the Court to assert its role as republican schoolmaster,[69] a teacher in a vital national seminar.[70] There are times when the controversy is of such character that, to prevent its recurrence and to assure respect for constitutional limitations, this Court must pass on the merits of a case.[71] This is one such case. More than being a teaching moment, this is not the first time that the Order of National Artists was conferred in the manner that is being assailed in this case.[72] If not addressed here and now, there is great probability that the central question involved in this case will haunt us again in the future. Every President may invoke absolute presidential prerogative and thrust upon us National Artists after his or her own heart, in total disregard of the advise of the CCP and the NCCA and the voice of the community of artists, resulting to repeated episodes of indignation and uproar from the artists and the public.
	GR No. 177131 2011-06-07	BOY SCOUTS OF PHILIPPINES v. COA LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
The BSP contends that Republic Act No. 7278 introduced crucial amendments to its charter; hence, the findings of the Court in Boy Scouts of the Philippines v. National Labor Relations Commission are no longer valid as the government has ceased to play a controlling influence in it. The BSP claims that the pronouncements of the Court therein must be taken only within the context of that case; that the Court had categorically found that its assets were acquired from the Boy Scouts of America and not from the Philippine government, and that its operations are financed chiefly from membership dues of the Boy Scouts themselves as well as from property rentals; and that "the BSP may correctly be characterized as non-governmental, and hence, beyond the audit jurisdiction of the COA." It further claims that the designation by the Court of the BSP as a government agency or instrumentality is mere obiter dictum. [20]
	GR No. 182574 2010-09-28	PROVINCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL v. COMMISSIONERS CARPIO, J.
The President's power of general supervision means the power of a superior officer to see to it that subordinates perform their functions according to law.[14] This is distinguished from the President's power of control which is the power to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the President over that of the subordinate officer.[15] The power of control gives the President the power to revise or reverse the acts or decisions of a subordinate officer involving the exercise of discretion.[16]
	GR No. 178158 2009-12-04	STRATEGIC ALLIANCE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. RADSTOCK SECURITIES LIMITED CARPIO, J.
Not being a government corporation created by special law, PNCC does not owe its creation to some charter or special law, but to the Corporation Code. Its powers are enumerated in the Corporation Code and its articles of incorporation. As an autonomous entity, it undoubtedly has the power to compromise, and to enter into a settlement through its Board of Directors, just like any other private corporation organized under the Corporation Code. To maintain otherwise is to ignore the character of PNCC as a corporate entity organized under the Corporation Code, by which it was vested with a personality and identity distinct and separate from those of its stockholders or members. (Boldfacing and underlining supplied) The Dissenting Opinion is woefully wide off the mark. The PNCC is not "just like any other private corporation" precisely because it is not a private corporation but indisputably a government owned corporation. Neither is PNCC "an autonomous entity" considering that PNCC is under the Department of Trade and Industry, over which the President exercises control. To claim that PNCC is an "autonomous entity" is to say that it is a lost command in the Executive branch, a concept that violates the President's constitutional power of control over the entire Executive branch of government.[56]
	GR No. 175352 2009-07-15	DANTE V. LIBAN v. RICHARD J. GORDON CARPIO, J.
Under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution,[14] the President appoints all officials and employees in the Executive branch whose appointments are vested in the President by the Constitution or by law. The President also appoints those whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law. Under this Section 16, the law may also authorize the "heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards" to appoint officers lower in rank than such heads of departments, agencies, commissions or boards.[15] In Rufino v. Endriga,[16] the Court explained appointments under Section 16 in this wise: Under Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, the President appoints three groups of officers. The first group refers to the heads of the Executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in the President by the Constitution. The second group refers to those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint. The third group refers to all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law.
	GR No. 170338 2008-12-23	GARCILLANO v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC INFORMATION NACHURA, J.
The Court, however, dismisses G.R. No. 170338 for being moot and academic. Repeatedly stressed in our prior decisions is the principle that the exercise by this Court of judicial power is limited to the determination and resolution of actual cases and controversies.[35] By actual cases, we mean existing conflicts appropriate or ripe for judicial determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, for otherwise the decision of the Court will amount to an advisory opinion. The power of judicial inquiry does not extend to hypothetical questions because any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities.[36] Neither will the Court determine a moot question in a case in which no practical relief can be granted. A case becomes moot when its purpose has become stale.[37] It is unnecessary to indulge in academic discussion of a case presenting a moot question as a judgment thereon cannot have any practical legal effect or, in the nature of things, cannot be enforced.[38]
	GR No. 178830 2008-07-14	ROLEX SUPLICO v. NATIONAL ECONOMIC REYES, R.T., J.
Petitioner Suplico cites this Court's rulings in Gonzales v. Chavez,[6] Rufino v. Endriga,[7] and Alunan III v. Mirasol[8] that despite their mootness, the Court nevertheless took cognizance of these cases and ruled on the merits due to the Court's symbolic function of educating the bench and the bar by formulating guiding and controlling principles, precepts, doctrines, and rules.
	GR No. 168338 2008-02-15	FRANCISCO CHAVEZ v. RAUL M. GONZALES PUNO, C.J.
Freedom of expression has gained recognition as a fundamental principle of every democratic government, and given a preferred right that stands on a higher level than substantive economic freedom or other liberties. The cognate rights codified by Article III, Section 4 of the Constitution, copied almost verbatim from the First Amendment of the U.S. Bill of Rights,[25] were considered the necessary consequence of republican institutions and the complement of free speech.[26] This preferred status of free speech has also been codified at the international level, its recognition now enshrined in international law as a customary norm that binds all nations.[27]

ARMITA B. RUFINO v. BALTAZAR N. ENDRIGA