Lawyerly

GR No. 160758

2014-01-15

DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PHILIPPINES v. GUARIÑA AGRICULTURAL

BERSAMIN, J.

dependent on the principal obligation,[33] such that enforcement of the mortgage contract will depend on whether or not there has been a violation of the principal obligation. While a creditor and a debtor could regulate the order in which they should comply with their reciprocal obligations, it is presupposed that in a loan the lender should perform its obligation the release of the full loan amount before it could demand that the borrower repay the loaned amount. In other words, Guariña Corporation would not incur in delay before DBP fully performed its reciprocal obligation.[34] Considering that it had yet to release the entire proceeds of the loan, DBP could not yet make an effective demand for payment upon Guariña Corporation to perform its obligation under the loan. According to Development Bank of the Philippines v. Licuanan,

GR No. 159370

2012-10-03

PALM TREE ESTATES v. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.

In the absence of a clear legal right, the issuance of the injunctive writ constitutes grave abuse of discretion. Injunction is not designed to protect contingent or future rights. It is not proper when the complainant's right is doubtful or disputed.[68] (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted.)

GR No. 165950

2010-08-08

EQUITABLE PCI BANK v. OJ-MARK TRADING

VILLARAMA, JR., J.

Moreover, in extrajudicial foreclosures, petitioners have the right to receive any surplus in the selling price. This right was recognized in Sulit v. CA, in which the Court held that "if the mortgagee is retaining more of the proceeds of the sale than he is entitled to, this fact alone will not affect the validity of the sale but simply gives the mortgagor a cause of action to recover such surplus.[34]

GR No. 184778

2009-10-02

BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS MONETARY BOARD v. NINA G. ANTONIO-VALENZUELA

VELASCO JR., J.

The respondent banks have failed to show their entitlement to the writ of preliminary injunction. It must be emphasized that an application for injunctive relief is construed strictly against the pleader.[14] The respondent banks cannot rely on a simple appeal to procedural due process to prove entitlement. The requirements for the issuance of the writ have not been proved. No invasion of the rights of respondent banks has been shown, nor is their right to copies of the ROEs clear and unmistakable. There is also no necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. Indeed the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction tramples upon the powers of the MB and prevents it from fulfilling its functions. There is no right that the writ of preliminary injunction would protect in this particular case. In the absence of a clear legal right, the issuance of the injunctive writ constitutes grave abuse of discretion.[15] In the absence of proof of a legal right and the injury sustained by the plaintiff, an order for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction will be nullified.[16]

GR No. 174986

2009-07-07

ARMAND O. RAQUEL-SANTOS v. CA

NACHURA, J.

Under the law on contracts, mora solvendi or debtor's default is defined as a delay in the fulfillment of an obligation, by reason of a cause imputable to the debtor. There are three requisites necessary for a finding of default. First, the obligation is demandable and liquidated; second, the debtor delays performance; and third, the creditor judicially or extrajudicially requires the debtor's performance.[70]

GR No. 167238

2009-03-25

DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PHILIPPINES v. SPS. JESUS AND ANACORITA DOYON

CORONA, J.

When the principal obligation becomes due and the debtor fails to perform his obligation, the creditor may foreclose on the mortgage[27] for the purpose of alienating the (mortgaged) property to satisfy his credit.[28]

GR No. 176246

2009-02-13

PREMIERE DEVELOPMENT BANK v. CENTRAL SURETY

NACHURA, J.

Mendoza v. Court of Appeals[33] forecloses any doubt that an acceleration clause is valid and produces legal effects. In fact, in Selegna Management and Development Corporation v. United Coconut Planters Bank,[34] we held that:Considering that the contract is the law between the parties, respondent is justified in invoking the acceleration clause declaring the entire obligation immediately due and payable. That clause obliged petitioners to pay the entire loan on January 29, 1999, the date fixed by respondent.

GR No. 168584

2007-10-15

REPUBLIC v. RAMON S. CAGUIOA

CARPIO MORALES, J.

Seventh. As a rule, courts should avoid issuing a writ of preliminary injunction which would in effect dispose of the main case without trial.[46] This rule is intended to preclude a prejudgment of the main case and a reversal of the rule on the burden of proof since by issuing the injunctive writ, the court would assume the proposition that petitioners are inceptively duty bound to prove.[47]

GR No. 142896

2007-09-12

CANELAND SUGAR CORPORATION v. REYNALDO M. ALON

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.

Petitioner's allegations do not make out any justifiable basis for the granting of any injunctive relief. Even when the mortgagors were disputing the amount being sought from them, upon the non-payment of the loan, which was secured by the mortgage, the mortgaged property is properly subject to a foreclosure sale. This is in consonance with the doctrine that to authorize a temporary injunction, the plaintiff must show, at least prima facie, a right to the final relief.[15]

GR NO. 169356

2007-08-28

CARMEN FANGONIL - HERRERA v. TOMAS FANGONIL

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

With respect to procedural matters, respondents argue that the petition is a combination of an appeal via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 and an independent civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court. This is based on the observation that petitioner impleaded the Court of Appeals as one of the respondents while at the same time raising issues of fact alone. Respondents posit that these are indicative of an "intention to categorize the petition to be under both Rules 65 and 45 of the Rules of Court" and should be dismissed outright. Although petitioner erroneously impleaded the Court of Appeals as one of the respondents, petitioner clearly and rightly invoked Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court as the remedy availed of. As we held in National Irrigation Administration v. Court of Appeals,[16] the appeal from a final disposition of the Court of Appeals is a petition for review under Rule 45 and not a special civil action under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court. Under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, decisions, final orders or resolutions of the Court of Appeals, regardless of the nature of the action or proceedings involved, may be appealed to us by filing a petition for review, which would be but a continuation of the appellate process over the original case.[17] The correct procedure is not to implead the Court of Appeals. This Court has ruled in several instances that where the Court of Appeals is impleaded as respondent in the Petition for Review, and the petition clearly invokes Rule 45, the Court of Appeals is merely omitted from the title of the case pursuant to Sec. 4(a) of Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court.[18] The Court of Appeals is herein omitted from the title of the case, as a liberal interpretation of the rules on technicality, in pursuit of the ends of justice and equity.[19]

GR NO. 168639

2007-01-29

ALDERITO Z. YUJUICO v. CEZAR T. QUIAMBAO

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.

x x x the possibility of irreparable damage without proof of actual existing right is not a ground for an injunction (Heirs of Asuncion v. Gervacio, Jr., 304 SCRA 322 [1999]). Where the complainant's right is doubtful or disputed, injunction is not proper. Absent a clear legal right, the issuance of the injunctive relief constitutes grave abuse of discretion (Id.).[28] Furthermore, Judge Emuslan's November 25, 2004 Order goes against the concept and objective of a writ of preliminary injunction. A writ of preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy, an adjunct to a main suit. It is also a preservative remedy, issued to preserve the status quo of the things subject of the action or the relations between the parties during the pendency of the suit. In Selegna Management and Development Corporation v. United Coconut Planters Bank,[29] we held:x x x. Injunction is not designed to protect contingent or future rights. It is not proper when the complainant's right is doubtful or disputed.

	GR No. 160758 2014-01-15	DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PHILIPPINES v. GUARIÑA AGRICULTURAL BERSAMIN, J.
dependent on the principal obligation,[33] such that enforcement of the mortgage contract will depend on whether or not there has been a violation of the principal obligation. While a creditor and a debtor could regulate the order in which they should comply with their reciprocal obligations, it is presupposed that in a loan the lender should perform its obligation the release of the full loan amount before it could demand that the borrower repay the loaned amount. In other words, Guariña Corporation would not incur in delay before DBP fully performed its reciprocal obligation.[34] Considering that it had yet to release the entire proceeds of the loan, DBP could not yet make an effective demand for payment upon Guariña Corporation to perform its obligation under the loan. According to Development Bank of the Philippines v. Licuanan,
	GR No. 159370 2012-10-03	PALM TREE ESTATES v. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
In the absence of a clear legal right, the issuance of the injunctive writ constitutes grave abuse of discretion. Injunction is not designed to protect contingent or future rights. It is not proper when the complainant's right is doubtful or disputed.[68] (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted.)
	GR No. 165950 2010-08-08	EQUITABLE PCI BANK v. OJ-MARK TRADING VILLARAMA, JR., J.
Moreover, in extrajudicial foreclosures, petitioners have the right to receive any surplus in the selling price. This right was recognized in Sulit v. CA, in which the Court held that "if the mortgagee is retaining more of the proceeds of the sale than he is entitled to, this fact alone will not affect the validity of the sale but simply gives the mortgagor a cause of action to recover such surplus.[34]
	GR No. 184778 2009-10-02	BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS MONETARY BOARD v. NINA G. ANTONIO-VALENZUELA VELASCO JR., J.
The respondent banks have failed to show their entitlement to the writ of preliminary injunction. It must be emphasized that an application for injunctive relief is construed strictly against the pleader.[14] The respondent banks cannot rely on a simple appeal to procedural due process to prove entitlement. The requirements for the issuance of the writ have not been proved. No invasion of the rights of respondent banks has been shown, nor is their right to copies of the ROEs clear and unmistakable. There is also no necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. Indeed the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction tramples upon the powers of the MB and prevents it from fulfilling its functions. There is no right that the writ of preliminary injunction would protect in this particular case. In the absence of a clear legal right, the issuance of the injunctive writ constitutes grave abuse of discretion.[15] In the absence of proof of a legal right and the injury sustained by the plaintiff, an order for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction will be nullified.[16]
	GR No. 174986 2009-07-07	ARMAND O. RAQUEL-SANTOS v. CA NACHURA, J.
Under the law on contracts, mora solvendi or debtor's default is defined as a delay in the fulfillment of an obligation, by reason of a cause imputable to the debtor. There are three requisites necessary for a finding of default. First, the obligation is demandable and liquidated; second, the debtor delays performance; and third, the creditor judicially or extrajudicially requires the debtor's performance.[70]
	GR No. 167238 2009-03-25	DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PHILIPPINES v. SPS. JESUS AND ANACORITA DOYON CORONA, J.
When the principal obligation becomes due and the debtor fails to perform his obligation, the creditor may foreclose on the mortgage[27] for the purpose of alienating the (mortgaged) property to satisfy his credit.[28]
	GR No. 176246 2009-02-13	PREMIERE DEVELOPMENT BANK v. CENTRAL SURETY NACHURA, J.
Mendoza v. Court of Appeals[33] forecloses any doubt that an acceleration clause is valid and produces legal effects. In fact, in Selegna Management and Development Corporation v. United Coconut Planters Bank,[34] we held that:Considering that the contract is the law between the parties, respondent is justified in invoking the acceleration clause declaring the entire obligation immediately due and payable. That clause obliged petitioners to pay the entire loan on January 29, 1999, the date fixed by respondent.
	GR No. 168584 2007-10-15	REPUBLIC v. RAMON S. CAGUIOA CARPIO MORALES, J.
Seventh. As a rule, courts should avoid issuing a writ of preliminary injunction which would in effect dispose of the main case without trial.[46] This rule is intended to preclude a prejudgment of the main case and a reversal of the rule on the burden of proof since by issuing the injunctive writ, the court would assume the proposition that petitioners are inceptively duty bound to prove.[47]
	GR No. 142896 2007-09-12	CANELAND SUGAR CORPORATION v. REYNALDO M. ALON AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
Petitioner's allegations do not make out any justifiable basis for the granting of any injunctive relief. Even when the mortgagors were disputing the amount being sought from them, upon the non-payment of the loan, which was secured by the mortgage, the mortgaged property is properly subject to a foreclosure sale. This is in consonance with the doctrine that to authorize a temporary injunction, the plaintiff must show, at least prima facie, a right to the final relief.[15]
	GR NO. 169356 2007-08-28	CARMEN FANGONIL - HERRERA v. TOMAS FANGONIL CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
With respect to procedural matters, respondents argue that the petition is a combination of an appeal via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 and an independent civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court. This is based on the observation that petitioner impleaded the Court of Appeals as one of the respondents while at the same time raising issues of fact alone. Respondents posit that these are indicative of an "intention to categorize the petition to be under both Rules 65 and 45 of the Rules of Court" and should be dismissed outright. Although petitioner erroneously impleaded the Court of Appeals as one of the respondents, petitioner clearly and rightly invoked Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court as the remedy availed of. As we held in National Irrigation Administration v. Court of Appeals,[16] the appeal from a final disposition of the Court of Appeals is a petition for review under Rule 45 and not a special civil action under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court. Under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, decisions, final orders or resolutions of the Court of Appeals, regardless of the nature of the action or proceedings involved, may be appealed to us by filing a petition for review, which would be but a continuation of the appellate process over the original case.[17] The correct procedure is not to implead the Court of Appeals. This Court has ruled in several instances that where the Court of Appeals is impleaded as respondent in the Petition for Review, and the petition clearly invokes Rule 45, the Court of Appeals is merely omitted from the title of the case pursuant to Sec. 4(a) of Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court.[18] The Court of Appeals is herein omitted from the title of the case, as a liberal interpretation of the rules on technicality, in pursuit of the ends of justice and equity.[19]
	GR NO. 168639 2007-01-29	ALDERITO Z. YUJUICO v. CEZAR T. QUIAMBAO SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.
x x x the possibility of irreparable damage without proof of actual existing right is not a ground for an injunction (Heirs of Asuncion v. Gervacio, Jr., 304 SCRA 322 [1999]). Where the complainant's right is doubtful or disputed, injunction is not proper. Absent a clear legal right, the issuance of the injunctive relief constitutes grave abuse of discretion (Id.).[28] Furthermore, Judge Emuslan's November 25, 2004 Order goes against the concept and objective of a writ of preliminary injunction. A writ of preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy, an adjunct to a main suit. It is also a preservative remedy, issued to preserve the status quo of the things subject of the action or the relations between the parties during the pendency of the suit. In Selegna Management and Development Corporation v. United Coconut Planters Bank,[29] we held:x x x. Injunction is not designed to protect contingent or future rights. It is not proper when the complainant's right is doubtful or disputed.

SELEGNA MANAGEMENT v. UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS BANK