This case has been cited 8 times or more.
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2014-06-02 |
BRION, J. |
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| Because of the petitioner bank's failure to rebut the allegation that the subject property was acquired during the former's marriage to Ligaya, the legal presumption of the conjugal nature of the property, in line with Article 160 of the Civil Code, applies to this property. Proof of the subject property's acquisition during the subsistence of marriage suffices to render the statutory presumption operative.[8] | |||||
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2013-08-07 |
PERLAS-BERNABE, J. |
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| Pertinent to the resolution of this second issue is Article 160 of the Civil Code[38] which states that "[a]ll property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife." For this presumption to apply, the party invoking the same must, however, preliminarily prove that the property was indeed acquired during the marriage. As held in Go v. Yamane:[39] | |||||
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2012-02-08 |
PEREZ, J. |
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| As the parties invoking the presumption of conjugality under Article 160 of the Civil Code, the Dela Peñas did not even come close to proving that the subject property was acquired during the marriage between Antonia and Antegono. Beyond Antonia's bare and uncorroborated assertion that the property was purchased when she was already married,[34] the record is bereft of any evidence from which the actual date of acquisition of the realty can be ascertained. When queried about the matter during his cross-examination, even Alvin admitted that his sole basis for saying that the property was owned by his parents was Antonia's unilateral pronouncement to the effect.[35] Considering that the presumption of conjugality does not operate if there is no showing of when the property alleged to be conjugal was acquired,[36] we find that the CA cannot be faulted for ruling that the realty in litigation was Antonia's exclusive property. | |||||
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2011-02-16 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| Moreover, the power of the NLRC, or the courts, to execute its judgment extends only to properties unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor alone.[29] A sheriff, therefore, has no authority to attach the property of any person except that of the judgment debtor.[30] Likewise, there is no showing that the sheriff ever tried to execute on the properties of the corporation. | |||||
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2009-07-23 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| Such presumption is rebuttable only with strong, clear, categorical, and convincing evidence.[14] There must be clear evidence of the exclusive ownership of one of the spouses,[15] and the burden of proof rests upon the party asserting it.[16] | |||||
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2009-04-24 |
TINGA, J. |
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| To reiterate, conjugal property cannot be held liable for the personal obligation contracted by one spouse, unless some advantage or benefit is shown to have accrued to the conjugal partnership.[17] | |||||
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2008-09-17 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| The Court finds that it was grave error for the RTC to proceed with the execution, levy and sale of the subject property. The power of the court in executing judgments extends only to properties unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor alone, [15] in the present case to those belonging to Michele and Matrai. One man's goods shall not be sold for another man's debts.[16] | |||||
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2007-12-10 |
AZCUNA, J. |
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| Article 160. All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. All properties acquired during the marriage are thus disputably presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership. As a condition for the operation of above article, in favor of the conjugal partnership, the party who invokes the presumption must first prove that the property was acquired during the marriage.[35] | |||||