This case has been cited 5 times or more.
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2012-02-07 |
BRION, J. |
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| We are called to overturn a judgment of acquittal in favor of the respondents brought about by the dismissal, for insufficiency of evidence, of the malversation charged in the two criminal cases. As a rule, once the court grants the demurrer, the grant amounts to an acquittal; any further prosecution of the accused would violate the constitutional proscription on double jeopardy.[20] Notably, the proscription against double jeopardy only envisages appeals based on errors of judgment, but not errors of jurisdiction. Jurisprudence recognizes two grounds where double jeopardy will not attach, these are: (i) on the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction;[21] and/or (ii) where there is a denial of a party's due process rights.[22] | |||||
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2010-08-11 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| Given that accused-appellant was already acquitted of the charge of violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 on the ground of reasonable doubt in Criminal Case No. 17620-R, her instant appeal relates only to her conviction for illegal possession of prohibited or regulated drugs in Criminal Case No. 17619-R. The Court can no longer pass upon the propriety of accused-appellant's acquittal in Criminal Case No. 17620-R because of the rule that a judgment acquitting the accused is final and immediately executory upon its promulgation, and that accordingly, the State may not seek its review without placing the accused in double jeopardy. Such acquittal is final and unappealable on the ground of double jeopardy whether it happens at the trial court or on appeal at the Court of Appeals.[28] | |||||
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2010-07-28 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| Given that Nelson was already acquitted of the charge of rape in Criminal Case No. 762-T on the ground of reasonable doubt, his instant appeal relates only to his convictions for rape in Criminal Case No. 763-T and for acts of lasciviousness in Criminal Case No. 781-T. We can no longer pass upon the propriety of Nelson's acquittal in Civil Case No. 762-T because the appeal before us is Nelson's and not the People's. And more importantly, it is the rule that a judgment acquitting the accused is final and immediately executory upon its promulgation, and that accordingly, the State may not seek its review without placing the accused in double jeopardy. Such acquittal is final and unappealable on the ground of double jeopardy whether it happens at the trial court or on appeal at the Court of Appeals.[21] | |||||
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2009-10-30 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| It is the conviction or the acquittal of the accused, or dismissal or termination of the case without the approval of the accused that bars further prosecution for the same offense or any attempt to commit the same or the frustration thereof.[32] At the heart of the policy is the concern that permitting the sovereign freely to subject the citizen to a second judgment for the same offense would arm the government with a potent instrument of oppression. The constitutional provision, therefore, guarantees that the State shall not be permitted to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense, and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty. Nevertheless, the prosecution is entitled to one opportunity to require the accused to stand trial. Should the prosecution waive this right to a full-blown trial, the defendant has the right to have his or her trial completed by a particular tribunal.[33] If the trial is terminated before it is completed, and it is dismissed with the consent of the defendant, then double jeopardy will not attach. | |||||
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2009-08-05 |
BRION, J. |
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| A judgment of acquittal is final and is no longer reviewable.[11] It is also immediately executory and the State may not seek its review without placing the accused in double jeopardy.[12] We had occasion to fully explain the reason behind the double jeopardy rule in People v. Velasco[13]: The fundamental philosophy highlighting the finality of an acquittal by the trial court cuts deep into "the humanity of the laws and in a jealous watchfulness over the rights of the citizen, when brought in unequal contest with the State x x x x." Thus Green expressed the concern that "(t)he underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent, he may be found guilty." | |||||