This case has been cited 4 times or more.
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2011-03-23 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| In any case, it can be inferred from the judgments of this Court in the two aforementioned cases that respondent, as owner of the subject lots, is entitled to the possession thereof. Settled is the rule that the right of possession is a necessary incident of ownership.[18] Petitioners, on the other hand, are consequently barred from claiming that they have the right to possess the disputed parcels of land, because their alleged right is predicated solely on their claim of ownership, which is already effectively debunked by the decisions of this Court affirming the validity of the deeds of sale transferring ownership of the subject properties to respondent. | |||||
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2010-06-29 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| Lastly, the Court has to point out that the issuance of the 10-year SAO by PAGCOR in lieu of the MOA with FDC is a breach of the MOA. The MOA in question was validly entered into by PAGCOR and FDC on December 23, 1999. It embodied the license and authority to operate a casino, the nature and extent of PAGCOR's regulatory powers over the casino, and the rights and obligations of FDC. Thus, the MOA is a valid contract with all the essential elements required under the Civil Code. The parties are then bound by the stipulations of the MOA subject to the regulatory powers of PAGCOR. Well-settled is the rule that a contract voluntarily entered into by the parties is the law between them and all issues or controversies shall be resolved mainly by the provisions thereof.[16] | |||||
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2007-12-19 |
CORONA, J. |
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| While the RTC categorically found that respondents had outstanding dollar- and peso-denominated loans with Equitable, it, however, failed to ascertain the total amount due (principal, interest and penalties, if any) as of July 9, 2001. The trial court did not explain how it arrived at the amounts of US$228,200 and P1,000,000.[62] In Metro Manila Transit Corporation v. D.M. Consunji,[63] we reiterated that this Court is not a trier of facts and it shall pass upon them only for compelling reasons which unfortunately are not present in this case.[64] Hence, we ordered the partial remand of the case for the sole purpose of determining the amount of actual damages.[65] | |||||