This case has been cited 5 times or more.
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2015-02-25 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
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| Villanueva does not impress. Her defense crumbles because she did not present proof of the supposed agreement. The receipt signed by her proved the transaction and her issuance of the postdated checks by listing the items bought and the postdated checks issued as payment. If the parties really agreed for Madarang to deposit the checks only after notice of the sufficiency of funds, then such agreement should have been incorporated in the receipt as an integral part of the transaction, or simply written in another document with Madarang's express conformity for Villanueva's protection. We simply cannot accept that Villanueva signed the receipt despite not including the supposed agreement that would shield her from probable criminal prosecution. In that regard, her being a businesswoman[23] presumably made her aware of the consequences of issuing unfunded checks.[24] All that she is claiming here is that the receipt did not express the true intention of the parties, implying that no written document substantiated her alleged defense. She did not claim at all that she had been coerced or intimidated into signing the receipt as written. Her self-serving statements on the agreement were entirely inadequate to establish her assertions, for they were not proof.[25] | |||||
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2012-01-25 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
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| The Court thus sees no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the RTC and the CA considering that they are based on existing evidence and reasonable conclusions drawn therefrom. It has been held time and again that factual findings of the trial court, its assessment of the credibility of witnesses and the probative weight of their testimonies and the conclusions based on these factual findings are to be given the highest respect. As a rule, the Court will not weigh anew the evidence already passed on by the trial court and affirmed by the CA.[36] Though the rule is subject to exceptions, no such exceptional grounds obtain in this case. | |||||
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2008-06-30 |
BRION,J. |
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| We see no reason to disturb these findings as they are based on existing evidence, and the conclusions drawn therefrom are patently reasonable. We have time and again held that the findings of facts of the trial court, its assessment of the credibility of witnesses and the probative weight of their testimonies, and the conclusions based on the these factual findings are to be given the highest respect; the trial court enjoys the unique advantage of being able to observe, at close range, the conduct and deportment of witnesses as they testify. These factual findings, when adopted and confirmed by the CA, are final and conclusive and need not be reviewed on the appeal to us. We are not a trier of facts; as a rule, we do not weigh anew the evidence already passed on by the trial court and affirmed by the CA.[49] Only after a showing that the courts below ignored, overlooked, misinterpreted, or misconstrued cogent facts and circumstances of substance that would alter the outcome of the case, are we justified in undertaking a factual review. No such exceptional grounds obtain in this case. | |||||
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2007-10-15 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| This Court finds no cogent reason to deviate from the assessment made by the RTC, duly affirmed by the CA anent the credibility of the said prosecution witnesses who testified during the trial of this case. Michael and Angelo clearly pointed out their exact location and the surrounding circumstances when they observed the petitioner and the felonious taking. Upon the directive of the trial court judge, Angelo even described his location and the respective distances of the houses in the neighborhood by walking around the courtroom.[35] It bears stressing that full weight and respect to the determination by the trial court of the credibility of witnesses is usually accorded by the appellate courts, since the trial court judge had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses.[36] This Court is not a trier of facts and, as a rule, we do not weigh anew the evidence already passed upon by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals.[37] Thus, in the case of Siccuan v. People,[38] we clearly held: We have consistently adhered to the rule that where the culpability or innocence of an accused would hinge on the issue of credibility of witnesses and the veracity of their testimonies, findings of the trial court are given the highest degree of respect. These findings will not be ordinarily disturbed by an appellate court absent any clear showing that the trial court has overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts of circumstances of weight or substance which could very well affect the outcome of the case. It is the trial court that had the opportunity to observe 'the witnesses' manner of testifying, their furtive glances, calmness, sighs or their scant or full realization of their oaths. It had the better opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and note their demeanor, conduct and attitude under grueling examination. Furthermore, Michael and Angelo are child witnesses. A child witness could not be expected to give a precise response to every question posed to him. His failure to give an answer to the point of being free of any minor inconsistencies is understandable and does not make him a witness less worthy of belief.[39] Inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses, when referring only to minor details and collateral matters, do not affect the substance of their declarations or the veracity or the weight of their testimonies. Although there may be inconsistencies on minor details, the same do not impair the credibility of the witnesses where there is consistency in relating the principal occurrence and positive identification of the accused.[40] To this Court, Michael and Angelo's testimonies are sufficiently and consistently credible as to establish that: (1) the crime of Theft was committed against the Lipaycos and (2) petitioner committed the said crime. | |||||
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2007-03-22 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| The damage suffered by private complainant had also been established. Private complainant had already transferred the title to the property to petitioner who subsequently subdivided the land and started selling the subdivided portions of the land. Yet, despite several demands, petitioner failed to pay the value of the dishonored check. These factual findings of the trial court, adopted and confirmed by the Court of Appeals, are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal to this Court.[14] | |||||