This case has been cited 4 times or more.
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2014-06-09 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
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| In the present case, the testimony of NBI Agent Segunial that while he was investigating Reyes, the latter confided to him that he (Reyes) heard petitioner telling Sotero "Ayaw ko nang abutin pa ng bukas yang si Berbon" and that he saw the two (petitioner and Sotero) armed with a .45 caliber pistol and an armalite, respectively, before boarding a red car, cannot be regarded as hearsay evidence. This is considering that NBI Agent Segunial's testimony was not presented to prove the truth of such statement but only for the purpose of establishing that on February 10, 1997, Reyes executed a sworn statement containing such narration of facts. This is clear from the offer of the witness' oral testimony.[36] Moreover, NBI Agent Segunial himself candidly admitted that he is incompetent to testify on the truthfulness of Reyes' statement.[37] Verily then, what the prosecution sought to be admitted was the fact that Reyes made such narration of facts in his sworn statement and not necessarily to prove the truth thereof. Thus, the testimony of NBI Agent Segunial is in the nature of an independently relevant statement where what is relevant is the fact that Reyes made such statement and the truth and falsity thereof is immaterial. In such a case, the statement of the witness is admissible as evidence and the hearsay rule does not apply.[38] Moreover, the written statement of Reyes is a notarized document having been duly subscribed and sworn to before Atty. Cesar A. Bacani, a supervising agent of the NBI. As such, it may be presented in evidence without further proof, the certificate of acknowledgment being a prima facie evidence of the due execution of this instrument or document involved pursuant to Section 30 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. As held in Gutierrez v. Mendoza-Plaza,[39] a notarized document enjoys a prima facie presumption of authenticity and due execution which must be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. Here, no clear and convincing evidence was presented by petitioner to overcome such presumption. Clearly, therefore, the CA did not err in its appreciation of Reyes' sworn statement as testified to by NBI Agent Segunial. | |||||
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2009-07-14 |
CARPIO MORALES, J. |
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| In the present case, even without the plea of guilt of appellant, the evidence presented by the prosecution supports his guilt beyond reasonable doubt[13] of the special complex crime of kidnapping with rape under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659.[14] Thus in People v. Larrañaga[15] the Court held: Where the law provides a single penalty for two or more component offenses, the resulting crime is called a special complex crime. Some of the special complex crimes under the Revised Penal Code are (1) robbery with homicide, (2) robbery with rape, (3) kidnapping with serious physical injuries, (4) kidnapping with murder or homicide, and (5) rape with homicide. In a special complex crime, the prosecution must necessarily prove each of the component offenses with the same precision that would be necessary if they were made the subject of separate complaints. As earlier mentioned, R.A. No. 7659 amended Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code by adding thereto this provision: "When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention, or is raped, or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed; and that this provision gives rise to a special complex crime. (Italics in the original; underscoring supplied) | |||||
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2008-03-14 |
CARPIO MORALES, J. |
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| (7) The trial judge must satisfy himself that the accused, in pleading guilty, is truly guilty. The accused must be required to narrate the tragedy or reenact the crime or furnish its missing details.[13] | |||||
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2007-10-10 |
TINGA, J, |
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| There is no hard and fast rule as to how a judge may conduct a "searching inquiry," or as to the number and character of questions he may ask the accused, or as to the earnestness with which he may conduct it, since each case must be measured according to its individual merit. However, the logic behind the rule is that courts must proceed with caution where the imposable penalty is death for the reason that the execution of such a sentence is irrevocable and experience has shown that innocent persons have at times pleaded guilty. An improvident plea of guilty on the part of the accused when capital crimes are involved should be avoided since he might be admitting his guilt before the court and thus forfeit his life and liberty without having fully comprehended the meaning and import and consequences of his plea. Moreover, the requirement of taking further evidence would aid this Court on appellate review in determining the propriety or impropriety of the plea.[22] | |||||