This case has been cited 5 times or more.
|
2010-12-15 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
||||
| Lest it be overlooked, accused-appellant fled to Victorias City, Negros Occidental right after the incident, an act that is evidence of his guilt. It is well-established that the flight of an accused is competent evidence to indicate his guilt; and flight, when unexplained, is a circumstance from which an inference of guilt may be drawn.[19] Indeed, the wicked flee when no man pursueth, but the innocent are as bold as lion.[20] | |||||
|
2010-07-05 |
VILLARAMA, JR., J. |
||||
| Even granting arguendo that Melody did not see the actual stabbing of her mother and two (2) sisters, the attendant circumstances point to no one else but the appellant as the perpetrator. Direct evidence of the actual killing is not indispensable for convicting an accused when circumstantial evidence can sufficiently establish his guilt. The oft-repeated rule has been that circumstantial evidence is adequate for conviction if there is more than one circumstance, the facts from which the inferences are derived have been proven and the combination of all circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.[39] While no general rule can be laid down as to the quantity of circumstantial evidence which will suffice in a given case, all the circumstances proved must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt. The circumstances proved should constitute an unbroken chain which leads to only one fair and reasonable conclusion that the accused, to the exclusion of all others, is the guilty person.[40] | |||||
|
2010-02-11 |
NACHURA, J. |
||||
| But circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction, as we ruled in People v. Castillo:[20] | |||||
|
2009-08-04 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
||||
| Appellants' flight is further evidence of their guilt. It is well-established that the flight of an accused is competent evidence to indicate his guilt; and flight, when unexplained, is a circumstance from which an inference of guilt may be drawn.[61] In the case before us, appellants were apprehended only on 2 June 2000, or almost two years after the informations were filed in court on 17 July 1998. We find their claim, that they did not resort to flight because they were not aware that warrants for their arrest were issued, to be untenable. As testified to by SPO2 Ramon Valencerina, he went to the respective residences of the appellants to serve the warrants[62] for their arrest, but they were not there. SPO1 Pepito Ventura, another Warrant Officer of the Dagupan City Police Station, tried to serve the duplicate copy of the warrants to no avail. We are likewise not persuaded by appellants' claim that they had remained in their barangay or had returned thereto for a considerable length of time. Such claim was belied by the declaration of Consolacion Quinto, mother of Councilor Quinto, that her people had been looking for the appellants in their barangay, and that it was impossible for her people not to find the appellants if they were indeed staying there. | |||||
|
2009-02-13 |
CORONA, J. |
||||
| In addition, appellant's act of pleading for his sister-in-law's forgiveness may be considered as analogous to an attempt to compromise, which in turn can be received as an implied admission of guilt under Section 27, Rule 130:[33] | |||||