This case has been cited 7 times or more.
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2015-08-12 |
JARDELEZA, J. |
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| It is different, however, when through Presidential Proclamations public agricultural lands have been reserved in whole or in part for public use or purpose, i.e., public school etc., because in such a case, conversion is no longer necessary. As held in Republic v. Estonilo,[54] only a positive act of the President is needed to segregate or reserve a piece of land of the public domain for a public purpose. As such, reservation of public agricultural lands for public use or purpose in effect converted the same to such use without undergoing any conversion process and that they must be actually, directly and exclusively used for such public purpose for which they have been reserved, otherwise, they will be segregated from the reservations and transferred to the DAR for distribution to qualified beneficiaries under the CARP.[55] More so, public agricultural lands already reserved for public use or purpose no longer form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture.[56] Hence, they are outside the coverage of the CARP and it logically follows that they are also beyond the conversion authority of the DAR. | |||||
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2013-11-20 |
MENDOZA, J. |
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| As earlier stated, in 1938, President Quezon issued Presidential Proclamation No. 265, which took effect on March 31, 1938, reserving for the use of the Philippine Army parcels of the public domain situated in the barrios of Bulua and Carmen, then Municipality of Cagayan, Misamis Oriental. The subject parcels of land were withdrawn from sale or settlement or reserved for military purposes, "subject to private rights, if any there be."[65] | |||||
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2010-06-18 |
PEREZ, J. |
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| It is different, however, when through Presidential Proclamations public agricultural lands have been reserved in whole or in part for public use or purpose, i.e., public school, etc., because in such a case, conversion is no longer necessary. As held in Republic v. Estonilo,[49] only a positive act of the President is needed to segregate or reserve a piece of land of the public domain for a public purpose. As such, reservation of public agricultural lands for public use or purpose in effect converted the same to such use without undergoing any conversion process and that they must be actually, directly and exclusively used for such public purpose for which they have been reserved, otherwise, they will be segregated from the reservations and transferred to the DAR for distribution to qualified beneficiaries under the CARP.[50] More so, public agricultural lands already reserved for public use or purpose no longer form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture.[51] Hence, they are outside the coverage of the CARP and it logically follows that they are also beyond the conversion authority of the DAR. | |||||
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2008-12-23 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| Commonwealth Act No. 141 (CA 141), also known as the Public Land Act, remains to this day the existing general law governing the classification and disposition of lands of the public domain, other than timber and mineral lands.[28] Under the Regalian doctrine embodied in our Constitution, land that has not been acquired from the government, either by purchase, grant or any other mode recognized by law, belongs to the State as part of the public domain.[29] No public land can be acquired by private persons through any other means, and it is indispensable that the person claiming title to public land should show that his title was acquired through purchase or grant from the State, or through any other mode of acquisition recognized by law.[30] | |||||
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2008-10-17 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| The instant petition involves a review of the factual findings of the trial and appellate courts. As a general rule, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari with this Court.[9] And we have always held that the factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the appellate court, are conclusive and binding on this Court; except when, as in this case, the judgment assailed is based on a misapprehension of facts.[10] | |||||
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2008-10-08 |
REYES, R.T., J. |
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| All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.[47] Thus, all lands that have not been acquired from the government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the State as part of the inalienable public domain.[48] Necessarily, it is up to the State to determine if lands of the public domain will be disposed of for private ownership. The government, as the agent of the state, is possessed of the plenary power as the persona in law to determine who shall be the favored recipients of public lands, as well as under what terms they may be granted such privilege, not excluding the placing of obstacles in the way of their exercise of what otherwise would be ordinary acts of ownership.[49] | |||||