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RENE CABARLES v. JUDGE BONIFACIO SANZ MACEDA

This case has been cited 6 times or more.

2015-09-14
JARDELEZA, J.
UIC's additional argument that the matter of net incremental proceeds is a non-issue, since it would be covered by the full settlement clause in the CBA, deserves scant consideration. As already discussed, the CBA— including the full settlement clause — did not take effect. Furthermore, we observe that UIC is effectively proposing that the Union waived its rights to the net incremental proceeds when the latter subsequently agreed to disregard the second paragraph of the agreement dated April 21, 2004. However, for a waiver to be effective, it must be certain and unequivocal[33] and cannot be presumed.[34] We rule that the mere omission of the paragraph pertaining to the manner of computing the net incremental proceeds is insufficient to prove the intent of the Union to abandon the rights of its members with respect to such proceeds.
2012-08-22
PERALTA, J.
However, it is also settled that this Court has full discretionary power to take cognizance of a petition filed directly with it if compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues raised, so warrant.[14] Under the present circumstances, the Court will take cognizance of this case as an exception to the principle of hierarchy of courts, considering that the Information against petitioner was filed way back in November 2001.[15] Any further delay in the resolution of the instant petition will be prejudicial to petitioner. Moreover, the principle may be relaxed when pure questions of law are raised as in this case.[16]
2009-09-10
VELASCO JR., J.
The doctrinal formulation may vary, but the bottom line is that the Court may except a particular case from the operations of its rules when the demands of justice so require.[45] Put a bit differently, rules of procedure are merely tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice.[46] Accordingly, technicalities and procedural barriers should not be allowed to stand in the way, if the ends of justice would not be subserved by a rigid adherence to the rules of procedure.[47] This postulate on procedural technicalities applies to matters of locus standi and the presently invoked principle of hierarchy of courts, which discourages direct resort to the Court if the desired redress is within the competence of lower courts to grant. The policy on the hierarchy of courts, which petitioners indeed failed to observe, is not an iron-clad rule. For indeed the Court has full discretionary power to take cognizance and assume jurisdiction of special civil actions for certiorari and mandamus filed directly with it for exceptionally compelling reasons[48] or if warranted by the nature of the issues clearly and specifically raised in the petition.[49]
2008-12-24
VELASCO JR., J.
The right to speedy trial, as an adjunct to the right of all persons to a speedy disposition of their cases before judicial and quasi-judicial bodies, requires that court proceedings should be conducted according to fixed rules and must be free from vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays.[13] The same right may also be considered violated when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured; or when without cause or justifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the parties having their case tried.[14] None of these circumstances are, to us, present in the instant case. While perhaps there might have been delays, accused-appellant does not state in some detail what or who caused the delays, or whether these are of the vexatious or oppressive kind.
2008-11-24
VELASCO JR., J.
The right to speedy trial, as an adjunct to the right of all persons to a speedy disposition of their cases before judicial and quasi-judicial bodies, requires that court proceedings should be conducted according to fixed rules and must be free from vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays.[13] The same right may also be considered violated when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured; or when without cause or justifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the parties having their case tried.[14] None of these circumstances are, to us, present in the instant case. While perhaps there might have been delays, accused-appellant does not state in some detail what or who caused the delays, or whether these are of the vexatious or oppressive kind.
2008-07-09
QUISUMBING, J.
In the interest of justice, we decided to give due course to the petition for certiorari and prohibition concerning the August 17, 2006 Order of the RTC. As a rule, petitions for the issuance of such extraordinary writs against an RTC should be filed with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of this Court's original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition.[27] Under the present circumstance however, we agree to take cognizance of this case as an exception to the principle of hierarchy of courts.[28] For while it has been held by this Court that a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non for the grant of a writ of certiorari, nevertheless such requirement may be dispensed with where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government.[29] Such is the situation in the case at bar.