This case has been cited 2 times or more.
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2008-06-27 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| It is sufficient that the foregoing elements be established, not by direct and clear evidence, but by mere substantial evidence or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Thus, for as long as some factual basis exists from which it can be drawn that the disease afflicted the claimant under the third condition, the disability ought to be considered compensable.[43] More importantly, once there is substantial evidence of the existence of such condition, the same cannot be diminished even by medical opinion to the contrary.[44] The yardstick in employees' compensation cases is mere probability, not certainty; thus, whatever doubt such contrary medical opinion may engender should be interpreted in favor of the employees for whom social legislations, like P.D. No. 626, are enacted. [45] | |||||
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2007-07-27 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| This increased risk theory can be made applicable in compensation cases, when the claimant can adduce reasonable proof of the connection between his work and the cause of the disease, or that that the risk of contracting the disease was increased by the claimant's working conditions.[6] Strict rules of evidence are not applicable to claims for compensation.[7] The degree of proof required under Presidential Decree No. 626 is merely substantial evidence, which means "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."[8] What the law requires is a reasonable work-connection and not a direct causal relation.[9] Medical opinion to the contrary can be disregarded, especially where there is some basis in the facts for inferring a work connection.[10] It is sufficient that the hypothesis on which the workmen's claim is based is probable since probability, not certainty, is the touchstone.[11] | |||||