This case has been cited 5 times or more.
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2014-11-12 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| Instead of requiring the vehicle's occupants to answer one or two routinary questions out of respect to what the Court has, in Abenes v. Court of Appeals,[23] adverted to as the motorists' right of "free passage without [intrusive] interruption," P/Insp. Aguilar, et al. engaged petitioner in what appears to be an unnecessary conversation and when utterances were made doubtless not to their liking, they ordered the latter to step out of the vehicle, concluding after seeing three (3) empty cases of beer at the trunk of the vehicle that petitioner was driving under the influence of alcohol. Then petitioner went on with his "plain view search" line. The remark apparently pissed the police officers off no end as one of them immediately lashed at petitioner and his companions as "mga lasing" (drunk) and to get out of the vehicle, an incongruous response to an otherwise reasonable plea. Defense witness, Joenilo Pano, graphically described this particular event in his sinumpaang salaysay, as follows: xxx matapos kami huminto ay naglapitan sa amin ang mga pulis, nag flash light sa loob ng sasakyan at sa aming mga mukha. | |||||
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2014-11-12 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| Going over the records, it is fairly clear that what triggered the confrontational stand-off between the police team, on one hand, and petitioner on the other, was the latter's refusal to get off of the vehicle for a body and vehicle search juxtaposed by his insistence on a plain view search only. Petitioner's twin gestures cannot plausibly be considered as resisting a lawful orders.[28] He may have sounded boorish or spoken crudely at that time, but none of this would make him a criminal. It remains to stress that the petitioner has not, when flagged down, committed a crime or performed an overt act warranting a reasonable inference of criminal activity. He did not try to avoid the road block established. He came to a full stop when so required to stop. The two key elements of resistance and serious disobedience punished under Art. 151 of the RPC are: (1) That a person in authority or his agent is engaged in the performance of official duty or gives a lawful order to the offender; and (2) That the offender resists or seriously disobeys such person or his agent.[29] | |||||
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2009-08-14 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence.[9] The plain view doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (1) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area; (2) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; and (3) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.[10] | |||||
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2009-04-22 |
BRION, J. |
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| One final observation: the Information was not rendered defective by the fact that Pedro was charged of violating Section 261(q) of the Code, instead of Section 32 of R.A. No. 7166, which amended Section 261(q); these two sections aim to penalize among others, the carrying of firearms (or other deadly weapons) in public places during the election period without the authority of the Comelec. The established rule is that the character of the crime is not determined by the caption or preamble of the information or from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated; the crime committed is determined by the recital of the ultimate facts and circumstances in the complaint or information[31] Further, in Abenes v. Court of Appeals,[32] we specifically recognized that the amendment under Section 32 of R.A. No. 7166 does not affect the prosecution of the accused who was charged under Section 261(q) of the Code. | |||||
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2008-03-03 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| The corpus delicti in the crime of illegal possession of firearms is the accused's lack of license or permit to possess or carry the firearm, as possession itself is not prohibited by law.[21] To establish the corpus delicti, the prosecution has the burden of proving that the firearm exists and that the accused who owned or possessed it does not have the corresponding license or permit to possess or carry the same.[22] | |||||