This case has been cited 3 times or more.
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2010-11-24 |
MENDOZA, J. |
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| At the outset, the Court has noticed that although this petition is denominated as Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, Kepco, in its assignment of errors, impugns against the CTA En Banc grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, which are grounds in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Time and again, the Court has emphasized that there is a whale of difference between a Rule 45 petition (Petition for Review on Certiorari) and a Rule 65 petition (Petition for Certiorari.) A Rule 65 petition is an original action that dwells on jurisdictional errors of whether a lower court acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.[24] A Rule 45 petition, on the other hand, is a mode of appeal which centers on the review on the merits of a judgment, final order or award rendered by a lower court involving purely questions of law.[25] Thus, imputing jurisdictional errors against the CTA is not proper in this Rule 45 petition. Kepco failed to follow the correct procedure. On this point alone, the Court can deny the subject petition outright. | |||||
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2009-07-30 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| Based on the foregoing, the Order of the RTC denying petitioner's Omnibus Motion to Dismiss is not appealable even on pure questions of law. It is worth mentioning that the proper procedure in this case, as enunciated by this Court, is to cite such interlocutory order as an error in the appeal of the case -- in the event that the RTC rules in favor of respondent -- and not to appeal such interlocutory order. On the other hand, if the petition is to be treated as a petition for review under Rule 45, it would likewise fail because the proper subject would only be judgments or final orders that completely dispose of the case.[34] | |||||
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2008-09-12 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| As a final note, we reject accused-appellant's argument that had he been found to have merely fingered AAA's sexual organ, he would only be convicted of acts of lasciviousness. As held in De Castro v. Fernandez, Jr., the new law on rape now includes sexual assault.[30] Although the amendment to the law on rape was made after accused-appellant was charged, it is well to point out that with its expanded definition, rape can now be committed through sexual assault by inserting "any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person."[31] | |||||