This case has been cited 4 times or more.
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2014-02-11 |
SERENO, C.J. |
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| "The essence of due process is reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit evidence in support of one's defense."[88] What is proscribed is lack of opportunity to be heard.[89] Thus, one who has been afforded a chance to present one's own side of the story cannot claim denial of due process.[90] | |||||
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2010-02-05 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
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| The appellant further asserts that there is a serious doubt as to the veracity of the offense charged since the Information alleges that the offense was committed on January 27, 2003 while the prosecution witness categorically averred that they arrested her in a buy-bust operation conducted on January 23, 2003. It does not escape our attention, however, that this issue has made its debut only in the Court of Appeals. In this regard, the rule is that issues not raised in the lower courts cannot be raised for the first time on appeal without offending the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process.[20] | |||||
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2008-09-17 |
CORONA, J. |
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| It is elementary that denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is a negative and self-serving evidence which has far less evidentiary value than the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. With respect to the issue of whether the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, erred in appreciating certain evidence against Gomba, we rule in the negative. It is a settled rule that factual findings of the trial courts, including their assessment of the witnesses' credibility, are entitled to great weight and respect, specially when affirmed by the CA.[16] Without any cogent or compelling proof that the lower courts committed reversible error in their decisions, we shall not deviate from the rule.[17] We therefore affirm the findings of both the RTC and the CA that Gomba committed estafa punishable under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of the RPC. | |||||
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2007-10-09 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| The other issues raised, i.e., whether or not the case was exceptional and whether or not the respondents posted a bond, are factual in nature. Suffice it to state that an inquiry into these issues necessitates a review of factual and evidentiary matters which is proscribed in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules.[28] Indubitably, this Court has stressed that the grant or denial of a writ of preliminary injunction (or restraining order) rests in the sound discretion of the court since the assessment and evaluation of evidence towards that end involve findings of facts left to the said court for its conclusive determination. Hence, the exercise of judicial discretion by a court in injunctive matters must not be interfered with.[29] | |||||