This case has been cited 8 times or more.
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2012-06-13 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| Petitioners argue that the Comelec's act of exercising its OTP the PCOS machines from Smartmatic-TIM after the period had already lapsed is illegal and unlawful.[16] They explain that the period within which the Comelec may exercise the OTP could last only until December 31, 2010 without extension as provided in the Comelec's bid bulletin.[17] They further assert that the Comelec's acceptance of Smartmatic-TIM's unilateral extension of the option period constitutes substantial amendment to the AES contract giving undue benefit to the winning bidder not available to the other bidders.[18] Petitioners also contend that the Comelec's decision to purchase and use the PCOS machines is unconstitutional, as it allows the Comelec to abrogate its constitutional duty to safeguard the election process by subcontracting the same to an independent provider (Smartmatic-TIM), who controls the software that safeguards the entire election process. The purchase of the PCOS machines for use in the May 2013 elections would be tantamount to a complete surrender and abdication of the Comelec's constitutional mandate in favor of Smartmatic-TIM. The control of the software and process verification systems places the Comelec at the end of the process as it merely receives the report of Smartmatic-TIM. This, according to petitioners, amounts to a direct transgression of the exclusive mandate of the Comelec completely to take charge of the enforcement and administration of the conduct of elections. [19] Lastly, petitioners aver that the Comelec's act of deliberately ignoring the palpable infirmities and defects of the PCOS machines, as duly confirmed by forensic experts, is in violation of Section 2, Article V of the Constitution, as it fails to safeguard the integrity of the votes. They went on by saying that the subject PCOS machines lack security features which can guaranty the secrecy and sanctity of our votes in direct contravention of RA 9369 which requires that the automated election system must at least possess an adequate security feature against unauthorized access. In deciding to purchase the PCOS machines despite the above-enumerated defects, the Comelec's decision are claimed to be unconstitutional.[20] | |||||
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2012-06-13 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| The retention money will be returned within five (5) working days after the expiration of the above warranty, provided, however, that the goods supplied are in good operating condition free from patent and latent defects, all the conditions imposed under the purchase contract have been fully met, and any defective machines, except to those attributable to the COMELEC, have been either repaired at no additional charge or replaced or deducted from the price under the Option to Purchase.[32] | |||||
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2012-04-24 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| To have legal standing, therefore, a suitor must show that he has sustained or will sustain a "direct injury" as a result of a government action, or have a "material interest" in the issue affected by the challenged official act.[12] However, the Court has time and again acted liberally on the locus standi requirements and has accorded certain individuals, not otherwise directly injured, or with material interest affected, by a Government act, standing to sue provided a constitutional issue of critical significance is at stake.[13] The rule on locus standi is after all a mere procedural technicality in relation to which the Court, in a catena of cases involving a subject of transcendental import, has waived, or relaxed, thus allowing non- traditional plaintiffs, such as concerned citizens, taxpayers, voters or legislators, to sue in the public interest, albeit they may not have been personally injured by the operation of a law or any other government act.[14] In David, the Court laid out the bare minimum norm before the so-called "non-traditional suitors" may be extended standing to sue, thusly: 1.) For taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure is unconstitutional; | |||||
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2010-07-08 |
BRION, J. |
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| Legal standing or locus standi refers to a party's personal and substantial interest in a case, arising from the direct injury it has sustained or will sustain as a result of the challenged governmental action. Legal standing calls for more than just a generalized grievance. The term "interest" means a material interest, an interest in issue affected by the governmental action, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. Unless a person's constitutional rights are adversely affected by a statute or governmental action, he has no legal standing to challenge the statute or governmental action.[20] | |||||
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2009-12-14 |
DE LEON, JR., J. |
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| a taxpayer need not be a party to the contract to challenge its validity.[43] As long as taxes are involved, people have a right to question contracts entered into by the government. | |||||
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2008-07-14 |
REYES, R.T., J. |
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| That the Chinese Government handpicked the ZTE Corporation to supply the goods and services to the Philippine Government does not make the ZTE Supply Contract an executive agreement. ZTE Corporation is not a government or even a government agency performing governmental or developmental functions like the Export-Import Bank of China or the Japan Bank for International Cooperation,[33] or a multilateral lending agency organized by governments like the World Bank.[34] ZTE Corporation is a business enterprise performing purely commercial functions. ZTE Corporation is publicly listed in the Hong Kong and Shenzhen stock exchanges, with individual and juridical stockholders that receive dividends from the corporation. | |||||
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2008-01-31 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| In Abaya v. Ebdane,[56] this Court outlined the history of Philippine procurement laws from the introduction of American public bidding through Act No. 22, enacted on October 15, 1900, and the subsequent laws and issuances. On October 8, 2001, President Arroyo issued EO 40 which repealed, amended, or modified all executive issuances, orders, rules and regulations, or parts inconsistent with her EO.[57] | |||||
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2007-06-08 |
GARCIA, J. |
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| It may be that IRR-A specifically defines its coverage to "all fully domestically-funded procurement activities," it being also provided that "foreign-funded procurement activities shall be the subject of a subsequent issuance." [27] However, a similarly drawn argument involving IRR-A was set aside in Abaya v. Ebdane,[28] a case involving Loan Agreement No. PH-P204 entered into by and between the RP and the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) for the implementation DPWH Contract Package No. I (CP I). Wrote the Court in Abaya:Admittedly, IRR-A covers only fully domestically-funded procurement activities from procurement planning up to contract implementation and that it is expressly stated that IRR-B for foreign-funded procurement activities shall be subject of a subsequent issuance. Nonetheless, there is no reason why the policy behind Section 77 of IRR-A cannot be applied to foreign-funded procurement projects like the CP I project. Stated differently, the policy on the prospective or non-retroactive application of RA 9184 with respect to domestically-funded procurement projects cannot be any different with respect to foreign-funded procurement projects .... It would be incongruous, even absurd, to provide for the prospective application of RA 9184 with respect to domestically-funded procurement projects and, on the other hand, as urged by the petitioners, apply RA 9184 retroactively with respect to foreign-funded procurement projects. To be sure, the lawmakers could not have intended such an absurdity. | |||||