This case has been cited 8 times or more.
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2013-06-26 |
REYES, J. |
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| Laches has been defined as the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence could or should have been done earlier.[47] It should be stressed that laches is not concerned only with the mere lapse of time.[48] | |||||
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2012-08-29 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
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| The petitioner's defense of prescription to bar Civil Case No. 722-M2002 presents another evidentiary concern. Article 1144 of the Civil Code requires, indeed, that an action to revive a judgment must be brought before it is barred by prescription, which was ten years from the accrual of the right of action.[25] It is clear, however, that such a defense could not be determined in the hearing of the petitioner's motion to dismiss considering that the complaint did not show on its face that the period to bring the action to revive had already lapsed. An allegation of prescription, as the Court put it in Pineda v. Heirs of Eliseo Guevara,[26] "can effectively be used in a motion to dismiss only when the complaint on its face shows that indeed the action has already prescribed, [o]therwise, the issue of prescription is one involving evidentiary matters requiring a full blown trial on the merits and cannot be determined in a mere motion to dismiss." | |||||
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2009-10-09 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| This Court agrees with the CA. The fact that the law is categorical that discontinuous easements cannot be acquired by prescription militates against petitioner's claim of laches. To stress, discontinuous easements can only be acquired by title. More importantly, whether or not the elements of laches are present is a question involving a factual determination by the trial court.[58] Hence, the same being a question of fact, it cannot be the proper subject of herein petition. On the other hand, as to the issue of estoppel, this Court likewise agrees with the finding of the CA that petitioner did not present any evidence that would show an admission, representation or conduct by respondents that will give rise to estoppel.[59] | |||||
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2009-07-03 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| Finally, we find respondents guilty of laches, the essence of which is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is the negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.[32] Laches is not concerned with the mere lapse of time, rather, the party must have been afforded an opportunity to pursue his claim in order that the delay may sufficiently constitute laches.[33] | |||||
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2008-12-10 |
CARPIO MORALES, J. |
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| At all events, since the complaint on its face does not indicate that the action has prescribed, Pineda v. Heirs of Eliseo Guevara[16] instructs:An allegation of prescription can effectively be used in a motion to dismiss only when the complaint on its face shows that indeed the action has already prescribed. Otherwise, the issue of prescription is one involving evidentiary matters requiring a full-blown trial on the merits and cannot be determined in a mere motion to dismiss. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) | |||||
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2008-06-30 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| Under the circumstances, may the Court nonetheless allow the conversion of the petition for declaratory relief and prohibition into an ordinary action? We are constrained to say: no. Although Section 6, Rule 63 might allow such course of action, the respondents did not argue the point, and we note petitioners' failure to specify the ordinary action they desired. We also cannot reasonably assume that they now seek annulment of the mortgages. Further, the records support the Court of Appeals' finding that this issue was not raised before the RTC.[31] The Court of Appeals therefore properly refused to entertain the issue as it cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.[32] | |||||
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2007-12-13 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| Yet, even if we apply the doctrine of laches to registered lands, it would still not bar petitioners' claim. It should be stressed that laches is not concerned only with the mere lapse of time.[16] The following elements must be present in order to constitute laches: (1) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation of which complaint is made for which the complaint seeks a remedy; (2) delay in asserting the complainant's rights, the complainant having had knowledge or notice, of the defendant's conduct and having been afforded an opportunity to institute a suit; (3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant would assert the right on which he bases his suit; and (4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant, or the suit is not held to be barred.[17] We note that the certificate of title in the name of Anacleto Nieto was found in respondent's possession but there was no evidence that ownership of the property was transferred to the municipality either through a donation or by expropriation, or that any compensation was paid by respondent for the use of the property. Anacleto allegedly surrendered the certificate of title to respondent upon the belief that the property would be expropriated. Absent any showing that this certificate of title was fraudulently obtained by respondent, it can be presumed that Anacleto voluntarily delivered the same to respondent. Anacleto's delivery of the certificate of title to respondent could, therefore, be taken to mean acquiescence to respondent's plan to expropriate the property, or a tacit consent to the use of the property pending its expropriation. | |||||