This case has been cited 4 times or more.
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2011-12-07 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| Petitioner does not dispute that the 1988 contract was executed freely and willingly between him and his late brother, and the Nisperos spouses. "The freedom of contract is both a constitutional and statutory right,"[53] and "the contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy."[54] The 1988 contract neither shortens the period provided under Section 119 nor does away with it. Instead, it gives the Nisperos spouses more time to reacquire the land that the State gratuitously gave them. The 1988 contract therefore is not contrary to law; instead it is merely in keeping with the purpose of the homestead law. Since the 1988 contract is valid, it should be given full force and effect. In Roxas v. De Zuzuarregui, Jr.,[55] we held: It is basic that a contract is the law between the parties. Obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties and should be complied with in good faith. Unless the stipulations in a contract are contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy, the same are binding as between the parties.[56] | |||||
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2008-10-17 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| In G.R. No. 140615 and G.R. Nos. 108292, 108386, 108548-49 and 108550,[21] this Court upheld the validity of the PCGG-Benedicto Compromise Agreement. The PCGG cannot be allowed to question repeatedly the provisions of the Compromise Agreement even if it now appears that it was short-changed in the settlement. It is a long-established doctrine that the law does not relieve a party from the effects of an unwise, foolish, or disastrous contract, entered into with all the required formalities and with full awareness of what he was doing.[22] Courts have no power to relieve parties from obligations voluntarily assumed, simply because their contracts turned out to be disastrous deals or unwise investments.[23] Therefore, no questions of facts and substance can be invoked in a second case that will disturb what had been adjudicated in Civil Case No. 0034, as they would unavoidably violate the principle of res judicata. | |||||
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2008-10-17 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| Under the afore-quoted procedural rules, for a summary judgment to be proper, the movant must establish two requisites: (a) there must be no genuine issue as to any material fact, except for the amount of damages; and (b) the party presenting the motion for summary judgment must be entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Where, on the basis of the pleadings of a moving party, including documents appended thereto, no genuine issue as to a material fact exists, the burden to produce a genuine issue shifts to the opposing party. If the opposing party fails, the moving party is entitled to a summary judgment.[29] | |||||
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2008-08-28 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| We have consistently expostulated that in summary judgments, the trial court can determine a genuine issue on the basis of the pleadings, admissions, documents, affidavits or counter affidavits submitted by the parties. When the facts as pleaded appear uncontested or undisputed, then there is no real or genuine issue or question as to any fact, and summary judgment is called for.[35] | |||||