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GR No. 166357

2015-01-14

BERSAMIN, J.

After a long and hard second look, we consider it improper and unwarranted to give to such expert opinions a merely generalized consideration and treatment, least of all to dismiss their value as inadequate basis for the declaration of the nullity of the marriage. Instead, we hold that said experts sufficiently and competently described the psychological incapacity of the respondent within the standards of Article 36 of the Family Code. We uphold the conclusions reached by the two expert witnesses because they were largely drawn from the case records and affidavits, and should not anymore be disputed after the RTC itself had accepted the veracity of the petitioner's factual premises.[17]

GR No. 159594

2012-11-12

REPUBLIC v. CA

BERSAMIN, J.

The foregoing pronouncements in Santos and Molina have remained as the precedential guides in deciding cases grounded on the psychological incapacity of a spouse. But the Court has declared the existence or absence of the psychological incapacity based strictly on the facts of each case and not on a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations.[20] Indeed, the incapacity should be established by the totality of evidence presented during trial,[21] making it incumbent upon the petitioner to sufficiently prove the existence of the psychological incapacity.[22]

GR No. 175367

2011-06-06

DANILO A. AURELIO v. VIDA MA. CORAZON P. AURELIO

PERALTA, J.

This Court, pursuant to Supreme Court Administrative Matter No. 02-11-10, has modified the above pronouncements, particularly Section 2(d) thereof, stating that the certification of the Solicitor General required in the Molina case is dispensed with to avoid delay. Still, Article 48 of the Family Code mandates that the appearance of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned be on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. [16]

GR No. 184063

2011-01-24

CYNTHIA E. YAMBAO v. REPUBLIC

NACHURA, J.

Preliminarily, the Court reiterates its recent pronouncement that each case for declaration of nullity under the foregoing provision must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections, or generalizations, but according to its own facts. And, to repeat for emphasis, courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.[42] Judicial understanding of psychological incapacity may be informed by evolving standards, taking into account the particulars of each case, current trends in psychological and even canonical thought, and experience.[43]

GR No. 173138

2010-12-01

NOEL B. BACCAY v. MARIBEL C. BACCAY

VILLARAMA, JR., J.

SO ORDERED.[9]

GR No. 170925

2009-10-26

RODOLFO A. ASPILLAGA v. AURORA A. ASPILLAGA

QUISUMBING, J.

Petitioner had the burden of proving the nullity of his marriage with respondent,[8] but failed to discharge it.

GR No. 166738

2009-08-14

ROWENA PADILLA-RUMBAUA v. EDWARD RUMBAUA

BRION, J.

A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, as a remedial measure, removed the mandatory nature of an OSG certification and may be applied retroactively to pending matters. In effect, the measure cures in any pending matter any procedural lapse on the certification prior to its promulgation. Our rulings in Antonio v. Reyes[27] and Navales v. Navales[28] have since confirmed and clarified that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC has dispensed with the Molina guideline on the matter of certification, although Article 48 mandates the appearance of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal to ensure that no collusion between the parties would take place. Thus, what is important is the presence of the prosecutor in the case, not the remedial requirement that he be certified to be present. From this perspective, the petitioner's objection regarding the Molina guideline on certification lacks merit.

GR No. 180668

2009-05-26

MARIETA C. AZCUETA v. REPUBLIC

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.

However, in more recent jurisprudence, we have observed that notwithstanding the guidelines laid down in Molina, there is a need to emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36.[14] Each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. In regard to psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court.[15] With the advent of Te v. Te,[16] the Court encourages a reexamination of jurisprudential trends on the interpretation of Article 36 although there has been no major deviation or paradigm shift from the Molina doctrine.

GR No. 166562

2009-03-31

BENJAMIN G. TING v. CARMEN M. VELEZ-TING

NACHURA, J.

To be forthright, respondent's argument that the doctrinal guidelines prescribed in Santos and Molina should not be applied retroactively for being contrary to the principle of stare decisis is no longer new. The same argument was also raised but was struck down in Pesca v. Pesca,[54] and again in Antonio v. Reyes.[55] In these cases, we explained that the interpretation or construction of a law by courts constitutes a part of the law as of the date the statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this Court is overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have acted in good faith, in accordance therewith under the familiar rule of "lex prospicit, non respicit."

GR No. 165424

2008-04-16

LESTER BENJAMIN S. HALILI v. CHONA M. SANTOS-HALILI

CORONA, J.

Petitioner had the burden of proving the nullity of his marriage with respondent.[5] He failed to discharge the burden.

	GR No. 166357 2015-01-14	VALERIO E. KALAW v. MA. ELENA FERNANDEZ BERSAMIN, J.
After a long and hard second look, we consider it improper and unwarranted to give to such expert opinions a merely generalized consideration and treatment, least of all to dismiss their value as inadequate basis for the declaration of the nullity of the marriage. Instead, we hold that said experts sufficiently and competently described the psychological incapacity of the respondent within the standards of Article 36 of the Family Code. We uphold the conclusions reached by the two expert witnesses because they were largely drawn from the case records and affidavits, and should not anymore be disputed after the RTC itself had accepted the veracity of the petitioner's factual premises.[17]
	GR No. 159594 2012-11-12	REPUBLIC v. CA BERSAMIN, J.
The foregoing pronouncements in Santos and Molina have remained as the precedential guides in deciding cases grounded on the psychological incapacity of a spouse. But the Court has declared the existence or absence of the psychological incapacity based strictly on the facts of each case and not on a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations.[20] Indeed, the incapacity should be established by the totality of evidence presented during trial,[21] making it incumbent upon the petitioner to sufficiently prove the existence of the psychological incapacity.[22]
	GR No. 175367 2011-06-06	DANILO A. AURELIO v. VIDA MA. CORAZON P. AURELIO PERALTA, J.
This Court, pursuant to Supreme Court Administrative Matter No. 02-11-10, has modified the above pronouncements, particularly Section 2(d) thereof, stating that the certification of the Solicitor General required in the Molina case is dispensed with to avoid delay. Still, Article 48 of the Family Code mandates that the appearance of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned be on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. [16]
	GR No. 184063 2011-01-24	CYNTHIA E. YAMBAO v. REPUBLIC NACHURA, J.
Preliminarily, the Court reiterates its recent pronouncement that each case for declaration of nullity under the foregoing provision must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections, or generalizations, but according to its own facts. And, to repeat for emphasis, courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.[42] Judicial understanding of psychological incapacity may be informed by evolving standards, taking into account the particulars of each case, current trends in psychological and even canonical thought, and experience.[43]
	GR No. 173138 2010-12-01	NOEL B. BACCAY v. MARIBEL C. BACCAY VILLARAMA, JR., J.
SO ORDERED.[9]
	GR No. 170925 2009-10-26	RODOLFO A. ASPILLAGA v. AURORA A. ASPILLAGA QUISUMBING, J.
Petitioner had the burden of proving the nullity of his marriage with respondent,[8] but failed to discharge it.
	GR No. 166738 2009-08-14	ROWENA PADILLA-RUMBAUA v. EDWARD RUMBAUA BRION, J.
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, as a remedial measure, removed the mandatory nature of an OSG certification and may be applied retroactively to pending matters. In effect, the measure cures in any pending matter any procedural lapse on the certification prior to its promulgation. Our rulings in Antonio v. Reyes[27] and Navales v. Navales[28] have since confirmed and clarified that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC has dispensed with the Molina guideline on the matter of certification, although Article 48 mandates the appearance of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal to ensure that no collusion between the parties would take place. Thus, what is important is the presence of the prosecutor in the case, not the remedial requirement that he be certified to be present. From this perspective, the petitioner's objection regarding the Molina guideline on certification lacks merit.
	GR No. 180668 2009-05-26	MARIETA C. AZCUETA v. REPUBLIC LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
However, in more recent jurisprudence, we have observed that notwithstanding the guidelines laid down in Molina, there is a need to emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36.[14] Each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. In regard to psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court.[15] With the advent of Te v. Te,[16] the Court encourages a reexamination of jurisprudential trends on the interpretation of Article 36 although there has been no major deviation or paradigm shift from the Molina doctrine.
	GR No. 166562 2009-03-31	BENJAMIN G. TING v. CARMEN M. VELEZ-TING NACHURA, J.
To be forthright, respondent's argument that the doctrinal guidelines prescribed in Santos and Molina should not be applied retroactively for being contrary to the principle of stare decisis is no longer new. The same argument was also raised but was struck down in Pesca v. Pesca,[54] and again in Antonio v. Reyes.[55] In these cases, we explained that the interpretation or construction of a law by courts constitutes a part of the law as of the date the statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this Court is overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have acted in good faith, in accordance therewith under the familiar rule of "lex prospicit, non respicit."
	GR No. 165424 2008-04-16	LESTER BENJAMIN S. HALILI v. CHONA M. SANTOS-HALILI CORONA, J.
Petitioner had the burden of proving the nullity of his marriage with respondent.[5] He failed to discharge the burden.

LEONILO ANTONIO v. MARIE IVONNE F. REYES