This case has been cited 5 times or more.
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2011-08-15 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| Second, the invocation of the rules on limitation of actions relative to a resulting trust is not on point because the resulting trust relation between Margarita and Roberto had been extinguished by the latter's death. A trust, it is said, terminates upon the death of the trustee, particularly where the trust is personal to him.[65] Besides, prescription and laches, in respect of this resulting trust relation, hardly can impair petitioner's cause of action. On the one hand, in accordance with Article 1144[66] of the Civil Code, an action for reconveyance to enforce an implied trust in one's favor prescribes in ten (10) years from the time the right of action accrues, as it is based upon an obligation created by law.[67] It sets in from the time the trustee performs unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the cestui que trust which are made known to the latter.[68] In this case, it was the 1992 sale of the properties to respondents that comprised the act of repudiation which, however, was made known to Margarita only in 1995 but nevertheless impelled her to institute the action in 1996 - still well within the prescriptive period. Hardly can be considered as act of repudiation Roberto's open court declaration which he made in the 1979 adoption proceedings involving respondents to the effect that he owned the subject properties,[69] nor even the fact that he in 1977 had entered into a lease contract on one of the disputed properties which contract had been subject of a 1996 decision of the Court of Appeals.[70] These do not suffice to constitute unequivocal acts in repudiation of the trust. | |||||
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2009-05-08 |
TINGA, J. |
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| As such, prescription and laches will run only from the time the express trust is repudiated. The Court has held that for acquisitive prescription to bar the action of the beneficiary against the trustee in an express trust for the recovery of the property held in trust it must be shown that: (a) the trustee has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the cestui que trust; (b) such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the cestui que trust, and (c) the evidence thereon is clear and conclusive.[26] Respondents cannot rely on the fact that the Torrens title was issued in the name of Epifanio and the other heirs of Jose. It has been held that a trustee who obtains a Torrens title over property held in trust by him for another cannot repudiate the trust by relying on the registration.[27] The rule requires a clear repudiation of the trust duly communicated to the beneficiary. The only act that can be construed as repudiation was when respondents filed the petition for reconstitution in October 1993. And since petitioners filed their complaint in January 1995, their cause of action has not yet prescribed, laches cannot be attributed to them. | |||||
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2008-03-07 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| The CA Amended Decision cannot be considered by the Court as a void judgment, as it was rendered by a tribunal with jurisdiction over the subject matter of the petition.[33] Neither can respondents complain that they were denied due process of law since they had the opportunity to be heard when they assailed the reduction of separation pay in their Petition for Certiorari, G.R. No. 162227, but bungled the same when they failed to comply with the basic procedural requirements in filing the petition. Respondents cannot be allowed to resurrect a cause lost thru negligence in properly pursuing their case. | |||||
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2007-11-23 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| Acquisitive prescription may bar the action of the beneficiary against the trustee in an express trust for the recovery of the property held in trust where (a) the trustee has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the cestui que trust; (b) such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the cestui que trust, and (c) the evidence thereon is clear and conclusive.[26] As a rule, however, the burden of proving the existence of a trust is on the party asserting its existence, and such proof must be clear and satisfactorily show the existence of the trust and its elements.[27] The presence of the following elements must be proved: (1) a trustor or settlor who executes the instrument creating the trust; (2) a trustee, who is the person expressly designated to carry out the trust; (3) the trust res, consisting of duly identified and definite real properties; and (4) the cestui que trust, or beneficiaries whose identity must be clear.[28] Accordingly, it was incumbent upon petitioner to prove the existence of the trust relationship. And petitioner sadly failed to discharge that burden. | |||||
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2007-09-03 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| The Court takes into consideration the fact that the HLURB Decision dated April 22, 1997 has long been final and executory. Nothing is more settled in the law than that a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and may no longer be modified in any respect even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law and whether it was made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land.[45] The only recognized exceptions to the general rule are the correction of clerical errors, the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, void judgments, and whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust and inequitable.[46] None of the exceptions is present in this case. The HLURB decision cannot be considered a void judgment, as it was rendered by a tribunal with jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint.[47] | |||||