This case has been cited 3 times or more.
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2014-07-23 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
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| Article 279 of the Labor Code, as amended, entitles an illegally dismissed employee to reinstatement. Article 223 of the Labor Code requires the reinstatement to be immediately executory even pending appeal. With its intent being ostensibly to promote the benefit of the employee, Article 223 cannot be the source of any right of the employer to remove the employee should he fail to immediately comply with the order of reinstatement.[31] In Roquero, the Court ruled that the unjustified refusal of the employer to reinstate the dismissed employee would entitle the latter to the payment of his salaries effective from the time when the employer failed to reinstate him; thus, it became the ministerial duty of the LA to implement the order of reinstatement.[32] According to Triad Security & Allied Services v. Ortega, Jr.,[33] the law mandates the prompt reinstatement of the dismissed or separated employee, without need of any writ of execution. In Pioneer Texturizing Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, [34] the Court has further observed: x x x The provision of Article 223 is clear that an award for reinstatement shall be immediately executory even pending appeal and the posting of a bond by the employer shall not stay the execution for reinstatement. The legislative intent is quite obvious, i.e., to make an award of reinstatement immediately enforceable, even pending appeal. To require the application for and issuance of a wit of execution as prerequisites for the execution of a reinstatement award would certainly betray and run counter to the very object and intent of Article 223, i.e., the immediate execution of a reinstatement order. The reason is simple. An application for a writ of execution and its issuance could be delayed for numerous reasons. A mere continuance of postponement of a scheduled hearing, for instance, or an inaction on the part of the Labor Arbiter or the NLRC could easily delay the issuance of the writ thereby setting at naught the strict mandate and noble purpose envisioned by Article 223. In other words, if the requirements of Article 224 were to govern, as we so declared in Maranaw, then the executory nature of a reinstatement order or award contemplated by Article 223 will be unduly circumscribed and rendered ineffectual. In enacting the law, the legislature is presumed to have ordained a valid and sensible law, one which operates no further than may be necessary to achieve its specific purpose. Statutes, as a rule, are to be construed in the lights of the purpose to be achieved and the evil sought to be remedied. And where the statute is fairly susceptible of two or more constructions, that construction should be adopted which will most tend to give effect to the manifest intent of the lawmaker and promote the object for which the statute was enacted, and a construction should be rejected which would tend to render abortive other provisions of the statute and to defeat the object which the legislator sought to attain by its enactment. In introducing a new rule on the reinstatement aspect of a labor decision under R.A. No. 6715, Congress should not be considered to be indulging in mere semantic exercise. On appeal, however, the appellate tribunal concerned may enjoin or suspend the reinstatement order in the exercise of its sound discretion. | |||||
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2008-11-07 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| As the law now stands, an illegally dismissed employee is entitled to two reliefs, namely: backwages and reinstatement. These are separate and distinct from each other. However, separation pay is granted where reinstatement is no longer feasible because of strained relations between the employee and the employer. In effect, an illegally dismissed employee is entitled to either reinstatement, if viable, or separation pay if reinstatement is no longer viable and backwages.[33] | |||||
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2008-07-30 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| On 28 July 2006, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution[14] dismissing outright CA-G.R. SP No. 01077-MIN for failure of petitioner to avail himself of the correct remedy under the law. Petitioner should have filed a Petition for Review under Rule 42 of the Revised Rules of Court, the proper remedy to appeal the adverse decisions rendered by the RTC in its appellate capacity. Instead, petitioner erroneously filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari[15] to assail the 20 January 2006 Decision and 8 April 2006 Resolution of the RTC in Civil Case No. 6087. The Court of Appeals also noted non-compliance by petitioner and his counsel with several more requirements for filing a petition with the Court of Appeals, namely: (a) shortage in the payment of the docket fees; (b) failure of petitioner's counsel to indicate the place of issue of his Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) number and his complete address; (3) failure of petitioner to furnish the appellate court which rendered the assailed decision, in this case the RTC, a copy of the Petition; and (4) failure of the Petition to state the material dates. | |||||