This case has been cited 5 times or more.
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2012-07-25 |
SERENO, J. |
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| Nevertheless, we proceed to the contention of petitioners against the RTC's dismissal of their Rule 65 Petition. In this regard, we stress that it is basic in our jurisdiction that a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is not a mode of appeal.[14] The remedy, which is narrow in scope,[15] only corrects errors of jurisdiction.[16] Thus, if the issue involves an error of judgment, the error is correctible by an appeal via a Rule 45 petition, and not by a writ of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.[17] | |||||
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2009-07-23 |
CARPIO MORALES, J. |
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| It is a familiar and fundamental doctrine in labor law that the CBA is the law between the parties and they are obliged to comply with its provisions.[8] If the terms of a contract, in this case the CBA, are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of their stipulations shall control.[9] | |||||
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2009-04-24 |
TINGA, J. |
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| A petition for certiorari is an extraordinary remedy that is adopted to correct errors of jurisdiction committed by the lower court or quasi-judicial agency, or when there is grave abuse of discretion on the part of such court or agency amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Where the error is not one of jurisdiction, but of law or fact which is a mistake of judgment, the proper remedy should be appeal. In addition, an independent action for certiorari may be availed of only when there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.[8] | |||||
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2008-02-13 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| It is familiar and fundamental doctrine in labor law that the CBA is the law between the parties and they are obliged to comply with its provisions.[16] We said so in Honda Phils., Inc. v. Samahan ng Malayang Manggagawa sa Honda:A collective bargaining agreement or CBA refers to the negotiated contract between a legitimate labor organization and the employer concerning wages, hours of work and all other terms and conditions of employment in a bargaining unit. As in all contracts, the parties in a CBA may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient provided these are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy. Thus, where the CBA is clear and unambiguous, it becomes the law between the parties and compliance therewith is mandated by the express policy of the law. [17] Moreover, if the terms of a contract, as in a CBA, are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of their stipulations shall control.[18] However, sometimes, as in this case, though the provisions of the CBA seem clear and unambiguous, the parties sometimes arrive at conflicting interpretations. Here, TSPIC wants to credit the increase granted by WO No. 8 to the increase granted under the CBA. According to TSPIC, it is specifically provided in the CBA that "the salary/wage increase for the year 2001 shall be deemed inclusive of the mandated minimum wage increases under future wage orders that may be issued after Wage Order No. 7." The Union, on the other hand, insists that the "crediting" provision of the CBA finds no application in the present case, since at the time WO No. 8 was issued, the probationary employees (second group) were not yet covered by the CBA, particularly by its crediting provision. | |||||
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2008-02-12 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| Pertinent is our ruling in Centro Escolar University Faculty and Allied Workers Union-Independent v. Court of Appeals,[20] where we held:We find that the Court of Appeals did not err in holding that petitioner used a wrong remedy when it filed a special civil action on certiorari under Rule 65 instead of an appeal under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court held in Luzon Development Bank v. Association of Luzon Development Bank Employees that decisions of the voluntary arbitrator under the Labor Code are appealable to the Court of Appeals. In that case, the Court observed that the Labor Code was silent as regards the appeals from the decisions of the voluntary arbitrator, unlike those of the Labor Arbiter which may be appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission. The Court noted, however, that the voluntary arbitrator is a government instrumentality within the contemplation of Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP) 129 which provides for the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. The decisions of the voluntary arbitrator are akin to those of the Regional Trial Court, and, therefore, should first be appealed to the Court of Appeals before being elevated to this Court. This is in furtherance and consistent with the original purpose of Circular No. 1-91 to provide a uniform procedure for the appellate review of adjudications of all quasi-judicial agencies not expressly excepted from the coverage of Section 9 of BP 129. Circular No. 1-91 was later revised and became Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95. The Rules of Court Revision Committee incorporated said circular in Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The inclusion of the decisions of the voluntary arbitrator in the Rule was based on the Court's pronouncements in Luzon Development Bank v. Association of Luzon Development Bank Employees. Petitioner's argument, therefore, that the ruling in said case is inapplicable in this case is without merit. | |||||