This case has been cited 9 times or more.
|
2011-09-07 |
VILLARAMA, JR., J. |
||||
| We are not persuaded by respondents' asseveration. They could have directly followed up the status of their case with the RTC especially during the period of Atty. Atienza's hospital confinement. As party litigants, they should have constantly monitored the progress of their case. Having completely entrusted their case to their former counsel and believing his word that everything is alright, they have no one to blame but themselves when it turned out that their opportunity to appeal and other remedies from the adverse ruling of the RTC could no longer be availed of due to their counsel's neglect. That respondents continued to rely on the services of their counsel notwithstanding his chronic ailments that had him confined for long periods at the hospital is unthinkable. Such negligence of counsel is binding on the client, especially when the latter offered no plausible explanation for his own inaction. The Court has held that when a party retains the services of a lawyer, he is bound by his counsel's actions and decisions regarding the conduct of the case. This is true especially where he does not complain against the manner his counsel handles the suit.[14] The oft-repeated principle is that an action for annulment of judgment cannot and is not a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal.[15] | |||||
|
2009-06-05 |
PERALTA, J. |
||||
| In People of the Philippines and Bricio Ygana v. Rafael Bitanga,[26] an exception to the foregoing rule is enunciated, and that is when the negligence of counsel had been so egregious that it prejudiced his client's interest and denied him his day in court. For this exception to apply, however, the gross negligence of counsel should not be accompanied by his client's own negligence or malice.[27] Clients have the duty to be vigilant of their interests by keeping themselves up to date on the status of their case.[28] Failing in this duty, they suffer whatever adverse judgment is rendered against them. | |||||
|
2009-06-05 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
||||
| The Court's dignity and authority would always be prey to attack were it to treat with abject indifference and look with complacent eyes on serious breaches of ethics and denigrating utterances directed against it. To preserve their authority and efficiency, safeguard the public confidence in them, and keep inviolate their dignity, courts of justice should not yield to the assaults of disrespect[21] and must, when necessary, wield their inherent power to punish for contempt, a power necessary for their own protection against improper interference with the due administration of justice.[22] | |||||
|
2009-04-24 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
||||
| Where fraud is the ground, the fraud must be extrinsic or collateral.[41] The extrinsic or collateral fraud that invalidates a final judgment must be such that it prevented the unsuccessful party from fully and fairly presenting his case or defense and the losing party from having an adversarial trial of the issue. There is extrinsic fraud when a party is prevented from fully presenting his case to the court as when the lawyer connives to defeat or corruptly sells out his client's interest.[42] Extrinsic fraud can be committed by a counsel against his client when the latter is prevented from presenting his case to the court.[43] | |||||
|
2008-10-24 |
PER CURIAM |
||||
| The power to declare a person in contempt of court and in dealing with him accordingly is a means to protect and preserve the dignity of the court, the solemnity of the proceedings therein and the administration of justice from callous misbehavior and offensive personalities.[73] Respect for the courts guarantees the stability of the judicial institution. Without such guarantee, the institution would be resting on a very shaky foundation.[74]The Court will not hesitate to wield this inherent power to preserve its honor and dignity and safeguard the morals and ethics of the legal profession.[75] | |||||
|
2007-07-12 |
PER CURIAM |
||||
| In resume, we find that respondent Ilustre has transcended the permissible bounds of fair comment and criticism to the detriment of the orderly administration of justice in her letters addressed to the individual Justices quoted in the show-cause Resolution of this court en banc, particularly the under lined portions thereof; in the language of the charges she filed before the Tanodbayan quoted and underscored in the same Resolution; in her statements, conduct, acts and charges against the Supreme Court and/or the official actions of the justices concerned and her ascription of improper motives to them; and in her unjustified outburst that she can no longer expect justice from this Court. The fact that said letters are not technically considered pleadings, nor the fact that they were submitted after the main petition had been finally resolved does not detract from the gravity of the contempt committed. The constitutional right of freedom of speech or right to privacy cannot be used as a shield for contemptuous acts against the Court. Atty. Roxas likewise cannot hide under the mantle of the right to privacy. It must be disclosed that prior to his letter addressed to Justice Nazario, Atty. Roxas first wrote then Chief Justice Panganiban asking for an investigation as to how the assailed decision was rendered and to sanction the perpetrators. The accusations contained therein are similar to those in his letter to Justice Nazario. The fact that his letters were merely addressed to the Justices of this Court and were not disseminated to the media is of no moment. Letters addressed to individual Justices, in connection with the performance of their judicial functions, become part of the judicial record and are a matter of concern for the entire court.[30] As can be gathered from the records, the letter to then Chief Justice Panganiban was merely noted and no show-cause order was issued in the hope that Atty. Roxas would stop his assault on the Court. However, since Atty. Roxas persisted in attacking the Court via his second letter, it behooved the Court to order him to explain why he should not be held in contempt of court and subjected to disciplinary action. | |||||
|
2007-07-12 |
PER CURIAM |
||||
| Rule 11.04. A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the record or have no materiality to the case. It is the duty of a lawyer as an officer of the court to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts and to promote confidence in the fair administration of justice and in the Supreme Court as the last bulwark of justice and democracy.[31] Respect for the courts guarantees the stability of the judicial institution. Without such guarantee, the institution would be resting on a very shaky foundation.[32] When confronted with actions and statements, from lawyers and non-lawyers alike, that tend to promote distrust and undermine public confidence in the judiciary, this Court will not hesitate to wield its inherent power to cite any person in contempt. In so doing, it preserves its honor and dignity and safeguards the morals and ethics of the legal profession.[33] | |||||
|
2007-03-12 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
||||
| We have aptly held in Mercado v. Security Bank Corporation,[9] that:A principle almost repeated to satiety is that "an action for annulment of judgment cannot and is not a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal." A party must have first availed of an appeal, a motion for new trial or a petition for relief before an action for annulment can prosper. Its obvious rationale is to prevent the party from benefiting from his inaction or negligence. x x x. | |||||
|
2007-01-31 |
CARPIO MORALES, J. |
||||
| Although Section 2 of Rule 47 of the Rules of Court provides that annulment of a final judgment or order of an RTC may be based "only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction," jurisprudence recognizes as additional ground therefor denial of due process.[22] So Arcelona v. Court of Appeals[23] teaches:It is clear then that to set aside a final and executory judgment, there are three remedies available to a litigant: first, a petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court on grounds of fraud, accident, mistake and excusable negligence filed within sixty (60) days from the time petitioner learns of the judgment but not more than six months from the entry thereof; second, a direct action to annul for a judgment on the ground of extrinsic fraud; and third, a direct action for certiorari or collateral attack to annul a judgment that is void upon its face or void by virtue of its own recitals. Thus, Macabingkil did not preclude the setting aside of a decision that is patently void where mere inspection of the judgment is enough to demonstrate its nullity on grounds of want of jurisdiction or non-compliance with due process of law. [Emphasis in original]. This doctrine is recognized in other cases: | |||||