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AYALA LIFE ASSURANCE v. RAY BURTON DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

This case has been cited 6 times or more.

	GR No. 200602 2013-12-11	ACE FOODS v. MICRO PACIFIC TECHNOLOGIES CO. PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
A contract is what the law defines it to be, taking into consideration its essential elements, and not what the contracting parties call it.[33] The real nature of a contract may be determined from the express terms of the written agreement and from the contemporaneous and subsequent acts of the contracting parties. However, in the construction or interpretation of an instrument, the intention of the parties is primordial and is to be pursued. The denomination or title given by the parties in their contract is not conclusive of the nature of its contents.[34]
	GR No. 166836 2013-09-04	SAN MIGUEL PROPERTIES v. SEC. HERNANDO B. PEREZ BERSAMIN, J.
An action for specific performance is the remedy to demand the exact performance of a contract in the specific form in which it was made, or according to the precise terms agreed upon by a party bound to fulfill it.[26] Evidently, before the remedy of specific performance is availed of, there must first be a breach of the contract.[27] The remedy has its roots in Article 1191 of the Civil Code, which reads:Article 1191. The power to rescind obligations is implied in reciprocal ones, in case one of the obligors should not comply with what is incumbent upon him.
	GR No. 161318 2009-11-25	JULIE NABUS v. JOAQUIN PACSON PERALTA, J.
The trial court, therefore, erred in applying Article 1191 of the Civil Code[48] in this case by ordering fulfillment of the obligation, that is, the execution of the deed of absolute sale in favor of the Spouses Pacson upon full payment of the purchase price, which decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Ayala Life Insurance, Inc. v. Ray Burton Development Corporation[49] held: Evidently, before the remedy of specific performance may be availed of, there must be a breach of the contract.
	GR No. 139047 2008-09-11	SPS. EMMA H. VER REYES AND RAMON REYES v. DOMINADOR SALVADOR CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
Viewed in light of the foregoing pronouncements, the Deed of Conditional Sale executed by Nicomedes in favor of Emma on 23 June 1965 is unmistakably a mere contract to sell. The Court looks beyond the title of said document, since the denomination or title given by the parties in their contract is not conclusive of the nature of its contents.[52] In the construction or interpretation of an instrument, the intention of the parties is primordial and is to be pursued.[53] If the terms of the contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations shall control. If the words appear to be contrary to the evident intention of the parties, the latter shall prevail over the former.[54]
	GR No. 172733 2008-08-20	SPS. CORNELIO JOEL I. ORDEN AND MARIA NYMPHA V. ORDEN v. SPS. ARTURO AUREA AND MELODIA C. AUREA CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
The trial court is mistaken. Rescission, whether judicially or by notarial act, is not required to be done by petitioners Orden. There can be no rescission of an obligation that is still non-existing, the suspensive condition not having happened.[41] In the case before us, there was no contract to rescind, judicially or by notarial act, because from the moment respondent Cobile failed to pay on time the correct amount of the balance of the purchase price, the contract between the parties was deemed ipso facto rescinded.[42] The reason for this is not that petitioners Orden have the power to rescind such contract, but because their obligation thereunder did not arise. The remedy of rescission under Article 1191[43] of the Civil Code is predicated on a breach of faith by the other party that violates the reciprocity between them. Such a remedy does not apply to contracts to sell.[44] Neither does the provision of Article 1592[45] apply to this case because what said article contemplates is a contract of sale.[46]
	GR NO. 156364 2007-09-03	JACOBUS BERNHARD HULST v. PR BUILDERS AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
In a contract of sale, the title passes to the buyer upon the delivery of the thing sold. The vendor has lost and cannot recover the ownership of the property until and unless the contract of sale is itself resolved and set aside.[40] On the other hand, a contract to sell is akin to a conditional sale where the efficacy or obligatory force of the vendor's obligation to transfer title is subordinated to the happening of a future and uncertain event, so that if the suspensive condition does not take place, the parties would stand as if the conditional obligation had never existed.[41] In other words, in a contract to sell, the prospective seller agrees to transfer ownership of the property to the buyer upon the happening of an event, which normally is the full payment of the purchase price. But even upon the fulfillment of the suspensive condition, ownership does not automatically transfer to the buyer. The prospective seller still has to convey title to the prospective buyer by executing a contract of absolute sale.[42]