This case has been cited 4 times or more.
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2015-07-08 |
PERLAS-BERNABE, J. |
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| That the issue on acqmsttlve prescription was not raised in these proceedings as petitioners would like this Court to believe is actually belied by the pleadings on record. To back track, acquisitive prescription was the basis behind the RTC-Branch 24's very first ruling in the Recovery Case declaring Rosario to be the lawful owner of Lot 1519-A. This same ruling was then explicitly incorporated as an integral part of Rosario's Complaint in the Annulment Case,[109] for which she had claimed to be the absolute owner of the same property.[110] At this stage, Roberto had already been apprised of the issue of prescription, as it related to Rosario's averment of her continued possession of Lot 1519-A, which was already a previously litigated issue between the same parties. To add, Rosario similarly stated in her pre-trial brief in the Annulment case that from the time the property was donated to her by Dy Chiao in 1938, she took actual physical possession over the same in the concept of an owner and, even constructed a residential house thereon where she was residing until her death on October 10, 2000.[111] The Pre-Trial Order[112] dated June 17, 2003 of the Annulment Case, in fact, reflected Rosario's reliance on the RTC-Branch 24's ruling in Civil Case No. RTC '89-1782,[113] which, in turn, related to the stipulated issue of whether or not plaintiffs, i.e., Rosario, et al., are the lawful and absolute owners of the subject property.[114] Jurisdiction over the issues of the case is determined and conferred by the pleadings filed in the case by the parties, or by their agreement in a pre-trial order or stipulation, or, at times by their implied consent as by the failure of a party to object to evidence on an issue not covered by the pleadings, as provided in Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.[115] Here, there is no dispute that the issue of possession as it relates to acquisitive prescription was raised through the facts above-stated, which then allowed the RTC-Branch 26 to acquire jurisdiction over said issue in the Annulment Case now before this Court on appeal. More so, the rule proscribing the Court from ruling on issues not raised hinges on considerations of due process and fairness.[116] But again, having been well aware that Rosario was relying on the RTC-Branch 24's ruling in the Recovery Case as basis for her alleged ownership over the property, and considering too her repetitive statements that she had been in actual possession of Lot 1519-A since 1938 in the concept of an owner, petitioners cannot pretend that their due process rights have been violated by the RTC Branch 26 as upheld by the CA and now, by this Court - in taking cognizance of the issue of acquisitive prescription. | |||||
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2010-11-15 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| The general rule is that this Court does not review factual findings of the trial court, which include the determination of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. It is only in exceptional cases where this Court sets aside the conclusions of the prosecutor and the trial court judge on the existence of probable cause, such as cases when the Court finds it necessary in order to prevent the misuse of the strong arm of the law or to protect the orderly administration of justice. The facts obtaining in this case do not warrant the application of the exception.[20] | |||||
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2010-03-09 |
CARPIO MORALES, J. |
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| It need not be underlined that jurisdiction over an issue in a case is determined and conferred by the pleadings filed by the parties, or by their agreement in a pre-trial order or stipulation or, at times by their implied consent as by the failure of a party to object to evidence on an issue not covered by the pleadings, as provided in Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court.[27] | |||||
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2007-11-23 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| To accord respect to the discretion granted to the prosecutor and for reasons of practicality, this Court, as a rule, does not interfere with the prosecutor's determination of probable cause. Otherwise, courts would be swamped with petitions to review the prosecutor's findings in such investigations.[42] In the same way, the general rule is that this Court does not review the factual findings of the trial court, which include the determination of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest.[43] It is only in exceptional cases when this Court may set aside the conclusions of the prosecutor and the trial judge on the existence of probable cause, that is, when it is necessary to prevent the misuse of the strong arm of the law or to protect the orderly administration of justice.[44] The facts obtaining in the present case warrant the application of the exception. | |||||