This case has been cited 5 times or more.
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2010-02-11 |
CORONA, J. |
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| Since the payment of legal fees is a vital component of the rules promulgated by this Court concerning pleading, practice and procedure, it cannot be validly annulled, changed or modified by Congress. As one of the safeguards of this Court's institutional independence, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is now the Court's exclusive domain. That power is no longer shared by this Court with Congress, much less with the Executive.[28] | |||||
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2007-02-28 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| Before a judgment becomes final and executory, that judgment may be amended. Upon finality of the judgment, the court loses its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same.[10] Except for correction of clerical errors or the making of nunc pro tunc entries which causes no prejudice to any party, or where the judgment is void, the judgment can neither be amended nor altered after it has become final and executory.[11] This is the principle of immutability of final judgment that is subject only to a few exceptions.[12] None of the exceptions are present in this case. | |||||
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2005-12-19 |
TINGA, J. |
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| More importantly, any talk of repeal (whether express or implied) by legislative enactment of the rules of procedure duly promulgated by this Court goes against the Constitution itself. The power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure was granted by the Constitution to this Court to enhance its independence.[84] It is no longer shared by this Court with Congress.[85] The legislature now has no power to annul, modify or augment the Rules of Court. We expressly declared in Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice[86] that the 1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure.[87] | |||||
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2002-09-23 |
PER CURIAM |
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| Justice[4] this Court, quoting from an early case[5] held that: "This Supreme Court has repeatedly declared in various decisions, which constitute jurisprudence on the subject, that in criminal cases, after the sentence has been pronounced and the period for reopening the same has elapsed, the court cannot change or alter its judgment, as | |||||