This case has been cited 4 times or more.
|
2009-07-15 |
BRION, J. |
||||
| Assuming further that MARINA merely committed a mistake in approving the vessel's proposed acquisition cost at P1,100,000.00, and that the Collector of the Port of Manila similarly erred, we reiterate the legal principle that estoppel generally finds no application against the State when it acts to rectify mistakes, errors,[18] irregularities, or illegal acts,[19] of its officials and agents, irrespective of rank. This ensures efficient conduct of the affairs of the State without any hindrance on the part of the government from implementing laws and regulations, despite prior mistakes or even illegal acts of its agents shackling government operations and allowing others, some by malice, to profit from official error or misbehavior. The rule holds true even if the rectification prejudices parties who had meanwhile received benefits.[20] | |||||
|
2008-10-15 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
||||
| To the contrary, the Court had already recognized in Sharp International Marketing v. Court of Appeals[21] thatthe LBP plays a significant role under the CARL and in the implementation of the CARP, thus:As may be gleaned very clearly from EO 229, the LBP is an essential part of the government sector with regard to the payment of compensation to the landowner. It is, after all, the instrumentality that is charged with the disbursement of public funds for purposes of agrarian reform. It is therefore part, an indispensable cog, in the governmental machinery that fixes and determines the amount compensable to the landowner. Were LBP to be excluded from that intricate, if not sensitive, function of establishing the compensable amount, there would be no amount "to be established by the government" as required in Sec. 6, EO 229. This is precisely why the law requires the [Deed of Absolute Sale (DAS)], even if already approved and signed by the DAR Secretary, to be transmitted still to the LBP for its review, evaluation and approval. | |||||
|
2005-08-03 |
TINGA, J. |
||||
| A similar observation can be made on the case of Sharp International Marketing v. Court of Appeals,[88] now cited by Philcemcor, wherein the Court asserted that the Land Bank of the Philippines was required to exercise independent judgment and not merely rubber-stamp deeds of sale entered into by the Department of Agrarian Reform in connection with the agrarian reform program. Philcemcor attempts to demonstrate that the DTI Secretary, as with the Land Bank of the Philippines, is required to exercise independent discretion and is not expected to just merely accede to DAR-approved compensation packages. Yet again, such grant of independent discretion is expressly called for by statute, particularly Section 18 of Rep. Act No. 6657 which specifically requires the joint concurrence of "the landowner and the DAR and the [Land Bank of the Philippines]" on the amount of compensation. Such power of review by the Land Bank is a consequence of clear statutory language, as is our holding in the Decision that Section 5 explicitly requires a positive final determination by the Tariff Commission before a general safeguard measure may be imposed. Moreover, such limitations under the SMA are coated by the constitutional authority of Section 28(2), Article VI of the Constitution. | |||||
|
2004-11-25 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
||||
| Respondent cited jurisprudence pronouncing that it is not just a "mere rubber stamp" but a "necessary cog"[30] in agrarian reform as it does not just exercise a ministerial function but has an "independent discretionary role"[31] in the valuation process of the land covered by land reform. Respondent further stressed that this Court, in the Decision, has recognized its right to appeal from an adverse decision in a just compensation case. | |||||