This case has been cited 3 times or more.
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2011-06-15 |
PEREZ, J. |
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| The conflicting decisions in CA-G.R. CEB-SP Nos. 02226 and 02232 would have been, in the first place, avoided had the CA consolidated said cases pursuant to Section 3, Rule III of its 2002 Internal Rules (IRCA). [39] Being intimately and substantially related cases, their consolidation should have been ordered to avert the possibility of conflicting decisions in the two cases. [40] Although rendered on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction acting within its authority, neither one of said decisions can, however, be invoked as law of the case insofar as the other case is concerned. The doctrine of "law of the case" means that whatever is once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule or decision between the same parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case, whether correct on general principles or not, [41] so long as the facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court. [42] Considering that a decision becomes the law of the case once it attains finality, [43] it is evident that, without having achieved said status, the herein assailed decisions cannot be invoked as the law of the case by either GMC or the Union. | |||||
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2010-02-25 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| However, when petitioner filed the motion to dismiss on 4 November 2004, the 30 March 2004 decision and the 17 May 2004 resolution of the trial court had long become final and executory upon the lapse of the 15-day reglementary period without any timely appeal having been filed by either party. The 30 March 2004 decision and the 17 May 2004 resolution may no longer be disturbed on account of the belated motion to dismiss filed by petitioner. The trial court was correct in denying petitioner's motion to dismiss. Nothing is more settled in law than that when a judgment becomes final and executory, it becomes immutable and unalterable. The same may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law.[33] The reason is grounded on the fundamental considerations of public policy and sound practice that, at the risk of occasional error, the judgments or orders of courts must be final at some definite date fixed by law. Once a judgment has become final and executory, the issues there should be laid to rest.[34] | |||||
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2009-07-22 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| The issue of the propriety of the Order of Default had already been adjudicated in Tansipek's Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals. As such, this issue cannot be readjudicated in Tansipek's appeal of the Decision of the RTC on the main case. Once a decision attains finality, it becomes the law of the case, whether or not said decision is erroneous.[10] Having been rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction acting within its authority, the judgment may no longer be altered even at the risk of legal infirmities and errors it may contain.[11] | |||||