This case has been cited 8 times or more.
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2009-12-04 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| Moreover, in Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, [120] the Court defined the limitation on the power of the Legislative Department to investigate a controversy exclusively pertaining to the Judicial Department, and regarded as an encroachment into the exclusive domain of judicial jurisdiction any probe or inquiry by the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee into the same justiciable controversy already before the Sandiganbayan, declaring:In fine, for the respondent [Senate Blue Ribbon] Committee to probe and inquire into that same justiciable controversy already before the Sandiganbayan, would be an encroachment into the exclusive domain of judicial jurisdiction that had much earlier set in. In Baremblatt v. United States, it was held that: | |||||
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2008-09-04 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| In Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee,[45] this Court ruled:The "allocation of constitutional boundaries" is a task that this Court must perform under the Constitution. Moreover, as held in a recent case, "the political question doctrine neither interposes an obstacle to judicial determination of the rival claims. The jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries has been given to this Court. It cannot abdicate that obligation mandated by the 1987 Constitution, although said provision by no means does away with the applicability of the principle in appropriate cases.[46] (Emphasis supplied) | |||||
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2008-03-25 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| Petitioner contends that respondent Committees' show cause Letter and contempt Order were issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. He stresses that his conversations with President Arroyo are "candid discussions meant to explore options in making policy decisions." According to him, these discussions "dwelt on the impact of the bribery scandal involving high government officials on the country's diplomatic relations and economic and military affairs and the possible loss of confidence of foreign investors and lenders in the Philippines." He also emphasizes that his claim of executive privilege is upon the order of the President and within the parameters laid down in Senate v. Ermita[10] and United States v. Reynolds. [11] Lastly, he argues that he is precluded from disclosing communications made to him in official confidence under Section 7[12] of Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise known as Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, and Section 24[13] (e) of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. | |||||
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2008-03-25 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| The Nixon and post-Watergate cases established the broad contours of the presidential communications privilege.[28] In United States v. Nixon,[29] the U.S. Court recognized a great public interest in preserving "the confidentiality of conversations that take place in the President's performance of his official duties." It thus considered presidential communications as "presumptively privileged." Apparently, the presumption is founded on the "President's generalized interest in confidentiality." The privilege is said to be necessary to guarantee the candor of presidential advisors and to provide "the President and those who assist him... with freedom to explore alternatives in the process of shaping policies and making decisions and to do so in a way many would be unwilling to express except privately." | |||||
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2007-12-27 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| Citing Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee,[7] the petitioners claim that since the issue of whether or not SCB-Philippines illegally sold unregistered foreign securities is already preempted by the courts that took cognizance of the foregoing cases, the respondent, by this investigation, would encroach upon the judicial powers vested solely in these courts. | |||||
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2006-08-15 |
TINGA, J. |
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| As evidenced by Arnault v. Nazareno[54] and Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee,[55] among others, the Court has not shirked from reviewing the exercise by Congress of its power of legislative inquiry.[56] Arnault recognized that the legislative power of inquiry and the process to enforce it, "is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function."[57] On the other hand, Bengzon acknowledged that the power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is not "absolute or unlimited", and its exercise is circumscribed by Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution.[58] From these premises, the Court enjoined the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee from requiring the petitioners in Bengzon from testifying and producing evidence before the committee, holding that the inquiry in question did not involve any intended legislation. | |||||
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2003-07-29 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| On the other hand, respondent Flaviano contends that the trial court may properly intervene into investigations by Congress pursuant to the power of judicial review vested in it by the Constitution. He avers that he has a valid cause of action to file the petition for prohibition considering that the Committee's investigation will delve into the validity of the patenting and titling of Lot X, MR-1160-D which, as admitted by petitioner, falls within the competence of judicial courts. In fact, the validity of the purchase by AFP-RSBS of the subject lot is already the subject of a pending action before the Regional Trial Court of General Santos City and the Ombudsman of Mindanao. Finally, he cites the case of Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee,[9] and argues that preliminary injunction may issue in cases pending before administrative bodies such as the Ombudsman or the Office of the Prosecutor as long as the right to self-incrimination guaranteed by the Bill of Rights is in danger. Furthermore, an information against him has been filed with the Sandiganbayan. | |||||