This case has been cited 2 times or more.
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2011-03-08 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| For his part, Prof. Owen Lynch (Prof. Lynch) manifests to this Court that he is not a member of the Philippine bar; but he is a member of the bar of the State of Minnesota. He alleges that he first taught as a visiting professor at the UP College of Law in 1981 to 1988 and returned in the same capacity in 2010. He further alleges that "[h]e subscribes to the principle, espoused by this Court and the Supreme Court of the United States, that `...[d]ebate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide open and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials."[103] In signing the Statement, he believes that "the right to speak means the right to speak effectively."[104] Citing the dissenting opinions in Manila Public School Teachers Association v. Laguio, Jr.,[105] Prof. Lynch argued that "[f]or speech to be effective, it must be forceful enough to make the intended recipients listen"[106] and "[t]he quality of education would deteriorate in an atmosphere of repression, when the very teachers who are supposed to provide an example of courage and self-assertiveness to their pupils can speak only in timorous whispers."[107] Relying on the doctrine in In the Matter of Petition for Declaratory Relief Re: Constitutionality of Republic Act 4880, Gonzales v. Commission on Elections,[108] Prof. Lynch believed that the Statement did not pose any danger, clear or present, of any substantive evil so as to remove it from the protective mantle of the Bill of Rights (i.e., referring to the constitutional guarantee on free speech).[109] He also stated that he "has read the Compliance of the other respondents to the Show Cause Resolution" and that "he signed the Restoring Integrity Statement for the same reasons they did."[110] | |||||
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2006-12-06 |
GARCIA, J. |
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| While its decision and resolution do not explicitly say so, the CA equated the right to form associations with the right to engage in strike and similar activities available to workers in the private sector. In the concrete, the appellate court concluded that inasmuch as GSIS employees are not barred from forming, joining or assisting employees' organization, petitioner Garcia could not validly initiate charges against GSIS employees waging or joining rallies and demonstrations notwithstanding the service-disruptive effect of such mass action. Citing what Justice Isagani Cruz said in Manila Public School Teachers Association [MPSTA] v. Laguio, Jr.,[15] the appellate court declared:It is already evident from the aforesaid provisions of Resolution No. 021316 that employees of the GSIS are not among those specifically barred from forming, joining or assisting employees organization such as [KMG]. If only for this ineluctable fact, the merit of the petition at bench is readily discernible.[16] | |||||