This case has been cited 3 times or more.
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2008-11-18 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| In any event, the Court in more than one instance has taken a liberal stance as far as standing is concerned. This is especially true when important constitutional issues are at stake. The cases of Philippine Constitution Association, Inc. v. Gimenez,[52] Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary,[53] Guingona, Jr. v. Carague,[54] Basco v. Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR),[55] Osmeña v. Commission on Elections,[56] Carpio v. Executive Secretary,[57] Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona, Jr.,[58] Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources,[59] and Agan v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc.,[60] bear witness to the liberal attitude of the Court on locus standi. | |||||
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2008-07-14 |
REYES, R.T., J. |
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| In Republic Telecommunications Holdings, Inc. v. Santiago,[21] the lone issue tackled by the Court of Appeals (CA) was whether the Securities Investigation and Clearing Department (SICD) and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) en banc committed reversible error in issuing and upholding, respectively, the writ of preliminary injunction. The writ enjoined the execution of the questioned agreements between Qualcomm, Inc. and Republic Telecommunications Holdings, Inc. (RETELCOM). The implementation of the agreements was restrained through the assailed orders of the SICD and the SEC en banc which, however, were nullified by the CA decision. Thus, RETELCOM elevated the matter to this Court praying for the reinstatement of the writ of preliminary injunction of the SICD and the SEC en banc. However, before the matter was finally resolved, Qualcomm, Inc. withdrew from the negotiating table. Its withdrawal had thwarted the execution and enforcement of the contracts. Thus, the resolution of whether the implementation of said agreements should be enjoined became no longer necessary. | |||||
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2005-10-13 |
TINGA, J. |
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| Debt service is not included in the General Appropriation Act, since authorization therefor already exists under RA Nos. 4860 and 245, as amended, and PD 1967. Precisely in the light of this subsisting authorization as embodied in said Republic Acts and PD for debt service, Congress does not concern itself with details for implementation by the Executive, but largely with annual levels and approval thereof upon due deliberations as part of the whole obligation program for the year. Upon such approval, Congress has spoken and cannot be said to have delegated its wisdom to the Executive, on whose part lies the implementation or execution of the legislative wisdom.[47] | |||||