This case has been cited 4 times or more.
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2011-03-29 |
BRION, J. |
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| Ramon P. Binamira v. Peter D. Garrucho, Jr.,[42] involving the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA), is an example of how this Court has recognized the validity of temporary appointments in vacancies in offices whose holders are appointed on staggered basis. Under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 189,[43] (the charter of the PTA, as amended by P.D. No. 564[44] and P.D. No. 1400[45]), the members of the PTA's governing body are all presidential appointees whose terms of office are also staggered.[46] This, notwithstanding, the Court sustained the temporary character of the appointment extended by the President in favor of the PTA General Manager, even if the law[47] also fixes his term of office at six years unless sooner removed for cause. | |||||
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2010-02-11 |
VILLARAMA, JR., J. |
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| Finally, the Court similarly finds respondents' theory that being just a "designation," and temporary at that, respondent Bautista was never really "appointed" as OIC Administrator of MARINA, untenable. In Binamira v. Garrucho, Jr.,[35] we distinguished between the terms appointment and designation, as follows: Appointment may be defined as the selection, by the authority vested with the power, of an individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office. When completed, usually with its confirmation, the appointment results in security of tenure for the person chosen unless he is replaceable at pleasure because of the nature of his office. Designation, on the other hand, connotes merely the imposition by law of additional duties on an incumbent official, as where, in the case before us, the Secretary of Tourism is designated Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Philippine Tourism Authority, or where, under the Constitution, three Justices of the Supreme Court are designated by the Chief Justice to sit in the Electoral Tribunal of the Senate or the House of Representatives. It is said that appointment is essentially executive while designation is legislative in nature. | |||||
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2008-01-28 |
AZCUNA, J. |
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| Opinion dated March 16, 2001 (Opinion No. 18, Series of 2001),[19] which ruled on the inapplicability of the rotational scheme of appointment enunciated in Imperial and Gaminde to the case of the Chairman and Members of the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB), petitioner advanced the argument that, applying the rule of noscitur a sociis, Sec. 16 of P.D. No. 564 should be construed as limited only to the non-ex officio part-time members of the PTA and should not be read or incorporated with Sec. 23-A thereof as the latter section merely fixes the term of office of the PTA General Manager at six years without expressly stating that such term is subject to the rotational system of appointment. Accordingly, the term of office of the PTA General Manager should start from the date of acceptance of the appointment and expire six years thereafter. He added that in Binamira v. Garrucho,[20] wherein the office of the PTA General Manager was likewise contested, this Court never mentioned the rotational scheme laid down in Imperial to determine the terms of office of the PTA Board members. | |||||
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2006-09-26 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| There is no question that the enactment of the assailed Resolutions involves the exercise of discretion and not merely a ministerial act that could be validly performed by a delegate, thus, the rule enunciated in the case of Binamira v. Garrucho[10] is relevant in the present controversy, to wit:An officer to whom a discretion is entrusted cannot delegate it to another, the presumption being that he was chosen because he was deemed fit and competent to exercise that judgment and discretion, and unless the power to substitute another in his place has been given to him, he cannot delegate his duties to another. | |||||