This case has been cited 7 times or more.
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2009-06-19 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| Since petitioners' right to the payment of their salaries by the City Government of Dumaguete is still unsettled at this point, the Court cannot issue a writ of mandamus against respondents to make such payment. Mandamus applies only where the petitioner's right is founded clearly in law and not when it is doubtful.[38] The writ will not issue to compel an official to give to the applicant anything to which he is not entitled by law.[39] Mandamus will not issue to establish a right, but only to enforce one that is already established.[40] | |||||
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2008-12-18 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| Generally, the writ of mandamus lies to require the execution of a ministerial duty.[8] A ministerial duty is one that "requires neither the exercise of official discretion nor judgment."[9] It connotes an act in which nothing is left to the discretion of the person executing it. It is a "simple, definite duty arising under conditions admitted or proved to exist and imposed by law."[10] Mandamus is available to compel action, when refused, on matters involving discretion, but not to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion one way or the other. | |||||
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2006-09-26 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| We agree with petitioners. In enumerating under Section 48 those who shall compose the National Power Board of Directors, the legislature has vested upon these persons the power to exercise their judgment and discretion in running the affairs of the NPC. Discretion may be defined as "the act or the liberty to decide according to the principles of justice and one's ideas of what is right and proper under the circumstances, without willfulness or favor.[8] Discretion, when applied to public functionaries, means a power or right conferred upon them by law of acting officially in certain circumstances, according to the dictates of their own judgment and conscience, uncontrolled by the judgment or conscience of others.[9] It is to be presumed that in naming the respective department heads as members of the board of directors, the legislature chose these secretaries of the various executive departments on the basis of their personal qualifications and acumen which made them eligible to occupy their present positions as department heads. Thus, the department secretaries cannot delegate their duties as members of the NPB, much less their power to vote and approve board resolutions, because it is their personal judgment that must be exercised in the fulfillment of such responsibility. | |||||
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2005-07-14 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| When the Secretary exercises the powers granted by Article 263(g) of the Labor Code, he is, indeed, granted great breadth of discretion. However, the application of this power is not without limitation, lest the Secretary would be above the law. Discretion is defined as the act or the liberty to decide, according to the principles of justice and one's ideas of what is right and proper under the circumstances, without wilfullness or favor.[26] Where anything is left to any person to be done according to his discretion, the law intends it must be done with a sound discretion, and according to law. The discretion conferred upon officers by law is not a capricious or arbitrary discretion, but an impartial discretion guided and controlled in its exercise by fixed legal principles. It is not a mental discretion to be exercised ex gratia, but a legal discretion to be exercised in conformity with the spirit of the law, and in a manner to subserve and not to impede or defeat the ends of substantial justice.[27] From the foregoing, it is quite apparent that no matter how broad the exercise of discretion is, the same must be within the confines of law. Thus, the wide latitude of discretion given the Secretary under Art. 263(g) shall and must be within the sphere of law. | |||||
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2004-07-08 |
TINGA, J, |
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| Philcemcor cites our 1912 ruling in Lamb v. Phipps[105] to assert that the DTI Secretary, having the final decision on the safeguard measure, has the power to evaluate the findings of the Tariff Commission and make an independent judgment thereon. Given the constitutional and statutory limitations governing the present case, the citation is misplaced. Lamb pertained to the discretion of the Insular Auditor of the Philippine Islands, whom, as the Court recognized, "[t]he statutes of the United States require[d] xxx to exercise his judgment upon the legality xxx [of] provisions of law and resolutions of Congress providing for the payment of money, the means of procuring testimony upon which he may act."[106] | |||||
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2002-09-17 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| of the same requires neither the exercise of official discretion nor judgment.[48] Hence, this Court cannot issue a writ of mandamus to control or review the exercise of discretion by the Ombudsman, for it is his discretion and judgment that is to be exercised and not that of the Court. When a decision has been reached in a matter involving discretion, a writ of mandamus may not be availed of to review or correct it, however erroneous it may be.[49] Moreover, as earlier discussed, petitioners had another remedy available in the ordinary course of law. Where such remedy is available in the ordinary course of law, mandamus will not lie.[50] WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioners. | |||||